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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW: CREATIVITY, 
SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY VS. PROPERTY AND MARKET 
By 
Daryana Iscrenova Kotzeva 
(Under the direction of Prof. L. R. Patterson) 
ABSTRACT 
     Copyright law in USA has a utilitarian objective, which has to be fulfilled through 
economic incentives given to authors. Creative works produce social and cultural benefits 
for society. Often the market power of the copyright owner, combined with property 
aspirations prevents the free flow of information and impedes learning. Restrictions of 
copyright owner’s monopoly such as the doctrine of fair use are inevitable. Free speech 
values in the Copyright Clause are consistent with broad public interest of information 
and are justified by the notion of liberty. The idea-expression dichotomy reconciles the 
conflict between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. Ideas are important 
components of the public domain. Public domain is reward for the grant of copyright. 
Challenges of the new information society require a respect and better understanding of 
the public purpose of copyright.  Democratic goals of Copyright Law cannot be obscured 
by market and property considerations. 
INDEX WORD: Copyright, Society, Author Property, Market, Education, Learning, Ideas, 
Public Domain, Liberty and Democracy
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
     Copyright law is a complex system to resolve the conflict between the public interests 
of disclosure and dissemination of works of “authorship” and the individual interest of 
the creator to exploit economically his own original copyrightable work. On one side 
there are commercial interests that invoke principles of the commercial world, and on the 
other side there are cultural and learning needs of society, which must be satisfied. It is 
also generally agreed that the issues in copyright are intertwined with these of 
commercial value.” Indeed, by affording authors limited monopoly protection for their 
writings, the U.S Constitution relies on wrangling Greed to promote the advancement of 
both creativity and profit.”1 The key issue in copyright law has always been the balance 
between society’s right to insist on access to creative expressions and the author’s power 
to restrict their distribution. Legal scholars have made many attempts to suggest 
reconciling theories but it is obvious that there is no sound solution to this fundamental 
dichotomy.2 The evolution of copyright doctrines proves that it is unlikely a  “ precarious 
balance” between the exclusive rights of authors and public needs to communicate freely 
with copyrighted materials will be achieved.3 Some of factors, which evidence the 
incoherence in the copyright law, are related to its specific nature. It has been recognized 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Jane. C.Ginsburg, ”Creation and Commercial value: Copyright Protection of works of 
information in the USA” 90 Colum. L.Rev. 1865 (1990) 
2See generally B.Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1927), (The reconciliation of the 
irreconcilable, the merger of antithesis, the synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of law)  
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that copyright is supposed to “bring the world of science, art and culture into relation 
with the world of commerce.”4 ”Functionally speaking, copyright must accommodate the 
interests of three groups: authors, entrepreneurs, and consumers. Thus copyright has three 
different purposes: cultural, economic and social”5 This difficult task can be implemented 
by relying on both kinds of principles: from the market and those, which refer to the 
intellectual or cultural progress in society. The legislators in the U.S.A. have adopted the 
understanding that authors should be granted certain economic rights, but the ultimate 
purpose of copyright law is the promotion of learning. The financial gains offered to the 
authors are believed to be an efficient instrument for fulfilling the utilitarian goal stated in 
the Copyright Clause in the Constitution. 6  However, very often when the material 
interests of the copyright owners are outweighed by public interest concerns, we become 
witnesses of a “market failure” in the copyright arena where copyright diverges from the 
traditional market system to generate a desirable outcome for society. It is essential to 
emphasize that inherent in copyright law, society is given priority and the Framers of the 
U.S.Constitution were convinced that the needs for learning must not be compromised. 
The chief goal of that thesis is to explain why and how copyright is essential for our 
educational, political, artistic and literary culture as well as apply this problem to 
property theories and market mechanism in copyright law. In the contemporary world of 
global capitalism the utilitarian message of copyright seems to some extent obscured and 
that creates a danger for the development of culture and science. The point is that the 
financial entitlements of the authors become often impediments for the individual and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3See Nein Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J.823,284(1996) 
4 See E.Phowman and L.Hamilton, Copyright, Intellectual property in the Information age, 25(2000) 
5See L.R.Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair use, 40 Vand. L.Rev.1, 54, (1987) 
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societal progress. Today people need fast and free access to information but often the 
courts favor the power of the copyright owner who denies that access. The justices 
following the “Law and Economics” approach in copyright analysis neglect the essential 
interest of the society to have a close and liberal contact with works of authorship. If that 
trend continues, values like culture, learning, democracy will vanish and will be replaced 
only with material concerns. The sole interest of the United States and the primary object 
in conferring the copyright monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public 
from the labors of authors.”7 In a free market system, the copyright owners can reap 
benefits for their work without diminishing the access of the public, especially when 
learning and culture are concerned. Many complications occur when authors start to 
claim property over their creations .It will be proved in the next pages that property is not 
compatible with learning because it poses limitations while learning insists on its 
promotion. Copyright must be interpreted without putting up barriers, which lead to 
unsatisfactory satiation of the public’s needs but at the same time enlarge the pecuniary 
rights of the copyright holder. 
     Copyright is a flexible concept, which is open to numerous interpretations and 
misconceptions. Today judges, deciding copyright cases, have to confront a complicated 
dilemma: which set of values to embrace either private interests of the copyright owner or 
public collective interests. Also the judges bear the responsibility of “rationalizing the 
contradictory features of copyright doctrine in terms of formal categories or underlying 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 U.S.Const.art. I, Sec. 8., cl.8 ”The Congress shall have the Power ….To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited times,to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive right to their 
perspective writings and discoveries” 
7 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S 123,128 (1932) 
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policies.”8 When considering copyright as a proprietary right, the justices will protect the 
owner’s interest and allow him to control the use of his work. In other instances the 
judges assert that society is entitled to have broad access to works of art and public 
availability should be more important than private motivation. Perhaps Justice Story was 
right when he said that copyright really deserves to be called “metaphysics of the law-
where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtle and refined, and sometimes, 
almost evanescent.” 9 Nevertheless, it is worth trying to explore the mysterious world of 
copyright and contemplate the reasons of its instability. This may help to distinguish the 
appropriate criteria to solve the problem concerning whose interests must prevail in 
copyright infringement cases. 
     The current copyright system is based on the economic philosophy because the 
authors producing works of authorship have a chance to enter into agreements with 
consumers, thus satisfying their subjective demands.10 Providing copyright owners with 
personal profit appears to be an excellent means to encourage their creative endeavors.  
Authors can enjoy a freedom of expression without being afraid of censorship and press 
control. The market mechanism allows authors to be independent in the creation process 
and to release to the public desirable “goods” in the form of books, movies, musical 
compositions, computer programs. The advantage of the market model, incorporated in 
copyright law, is that what spurs production and leads to an eclectic output in the 
intellectual sphere. The potential to earn income from the commercialization of new 
                                                          
8 Peter Jaszi, Toward a theory of copyright: the metamorphoses of “authorship”, Duke. L.J.455, 456, 
(1991)  
9 Folsom v. Marsh,9 F Cas.342,344 (1841) 
10 See Wendy J.Gordon, Fair use as market failure: a structural and economic analysis of the betamax case 
and its predecessors, 82 Colum.L.Rev. 1600, 1605 (1982)(The copyright system creates private property 
in creative works so that the market can simultaneously provide economic incentives for authors and 
disseminate authors’ works.) 
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works is the main incentive that helps authors to engage in creative activities. This does 
not build barriers to the democratic development of the society in need of diverse creative 
expressions. Being exposed to a variety of works gives members of society a choice of 
views and many works to enjoy. Their fundamental and non-economic interests in 
expressive diversity and informed citizenship seem to be satisfied. 11 Unfortunately, this 
scenario, that is described above sometimes differs from the reality because of many 
practical difficulties arising from the market rights of authors, which tend to block access 
of others for fears of competition. This provokes a controversy between the desire of the 
“users” to make transformative and educative uses of existing works and the absolute 
rights of copyright owners to prevent any unwanted use. In regard to these 
considerations, the “democratic paradigm”(understood as a conceptual framework for 
copyright) leads us to the statement that “copyright, like, many institutions of civil 
society, is in, but not entirely of, the market.”12  If the primary goal of copyright law were 
only to ensure efficiency, it would put in risk the promotion of learning, and 
consequently- the cultural enrichment of society. Given this tension between private 
reward and public benefit, the copyright owner must not be allowed to have a far-
reaching control over the possible productive uses of his work. Conversely, there is 
implied private censorship, which may be very dangerous for the expressive vitality and 
democratic character of public discourse, thus it is better to view copyright as a” state 
measure designed to enhance the independent and pluralist character of civil society” 
than to believe that it serves mainly the private economic interests of the copyright 
                                                          
11 See Netanel, Supra note 3,at 297 
12 See id. at 341 
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owners.13 In that way, copyright constitutes a framework for controlling the disclosure of 
ideas. Every person makes his/her own decision whether and how to express his/her 
view, opinion, plan, intention, knowledge or fantasy. “Just as a person’s sense of herself 
is intimately connected with the stream of ideas that constitutes consciousness, her public 
persona is determined in part by the ideas she expresses and the ways she expresses them. 
To require public disclosure of one’s ideas and thoughts-whether about personal or other 
matters-would distort one’s personality and, no doubt, alter the nature of one’s thoughts. 
It would seriously interfere with the liberty to live according to one’s chosen life plans. 
This sort of thought control would be an invasion of privacy and personality of the most 
intrusive sort .If anything is private, one’s undisclosed thoughts surely are.”14 The world 
at large has no right to an individual’s ideas. A person may decide to keep his/her ideas to 
him/her self, to express only a part of them or to publish them widely. Although society 
may benefit a lot from a person sharing his/her ideas, it cannot compel him to share. 
There is no general obligation for an author to bring his creation to the attention of the 
public, for the author retains the right to control the initial disclosure, stemming from our 
respect for the individual. Freedom of expression must be understood also that one has a 
right not to express one’s thoughts or ideas. Without exchange of ideas society may 
encounter serious problems since it will be deprived of progress. Nevertheless, we live in 
a world where communication plays a vital role in our survival. We need as many sources 
as possible of information to gain confidence in life, to increase our intellectual power 
and to maintain successful relationships with other members of society. This is why 
society must invent a system which will force authors to remove the veils from their 
                                                          
13 See id. at 288. 
14 See  e.g. Adam D.Moore, Intellectual Property –Moral, legal and International dilemmas 42 (1997 ) 
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creative works. The best method to achieve that is to provide owners of the ideas with an 
incentive via a series of legal rights and here lies the ambiguous " charm" of the 
copyright system. When the author is promised a profit for the distribution of his/her 
works, he/she will be not reluctant to do it. The trade-off in the copyright system is the 
desire of society to enlarge the public domain permanently while protecting certain 
private domains temporarily. 
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 CHAPTER II 
PURPOSE AND NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 
 
     All deliberations on copyright issues begin with the examination of Article 1, section 
8, Clause 8, known as the Copyright Clause, in the U.S. Constitution, because it is the 
only clause that grants this power to Congress. Under this section 8, Congress has the 
power to take such actions like declaring war, coining money, raising and supporting 
Armies, and providing and maintaining a Navy. However, no objective is explicitly stated 
Therefore, the Copyright Clause is unique because it contains a clear indication of the 
goal of copyright law.15 The framers of the American constitution, keeping in mind the 
history of copyright, expressly provided for its purpose: to promote the progress of 
knowledge and learning. The genesis of copyright is related with the invention of the 
printing press and its introduction into England. In 1557, Philip and Mary (Tudor) 
granted the stationers a royal charter creating the Stationers’ Company. The members of 
that entity were almost all of the printers in England-they were businessmen who 
manufactured and sold books .The charter empowered the company to seek and destroy 
“unlawful books”, which gave the guild the public enforcement mechanism for its private 
law .As a result, the copyright in its nascent phase was perceived as an instrument of 
censorship-a device to control the distribution of printed material.” 16 Obviously the 
                                                          
15See e.g. Lydia Pallas Loren, The purpose of Copyright,( http://www.law.asu.edu/Home 
Pages/Karjala/opposing CR extension) 
16 See generally L.Ray Patterson and Stanley W.Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright:A Law of 
Users’Rights(1991) 
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founders did not want to perpetuate the misuse of that right as a tool for censorship since 
that would stifle creativity and freedom of expression. They were reluctant to tolerate a 
system where the dissemination of the works would depend on somebody else than the 
author. Their view has been that publishers should not hold a monopoly of the press as 
their power to government control has been the strongest argument for not granting 
copyright protection directly to publishers.17  The main source for the copyright clause is 
the Statute of Queen Anne (enacted in 1710) that abolished the stationers’ copyright in 
England and destroyed the booksellers’ cartel. This is considered to be the first law on 
authors’ right in modern times. One of the most important features of the Statute of Anne 
was that it was intended to serve primarily the public interest.It created a statutory 
copyright with three dimensions-cultural, economic, and social. First, by using copyright 
as an incentive to create, the statute encouraged authors to contribute to the culture of 
society. Second, by protecting the right to publish a work, it gave entrepreneurs the 
incentive to distribute the works. Finally, by limiting the rights of the copyright owner to 
rights that were economic in nature, it gave the user freedom to use the work for purpose 
of learning.”18 The U.S. framers successfully implemented the concept that made the 
Statute of Anne so significant. This allowed them to recognize the authors’ need for 
independence in creating and spreading their works of imagination or products of 
intellectual labor. The belief was that these acts ultimately had to favor the whole society. 
By assuring the author of an original work the exclusive benefits of whatever commercial 
success his/her work enjoys, the law obviously fostered creativity. Being provided with 
an economic inducement, authors must be willing to enclose the results of their labor in 
                                                          
17See  Patterson, supra note 5 at 26 
18 See Id  
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other to contribute to the widest possible dissemination of information.  They possess 
total freedom in determining the subject, content and manner of expression. The invisible 
hand of the market is the only force that can define the actions of a single author. This is 
why only a concept of copyright as a trade regulation could ensure liberty and self-
reliance for the participants in that specific market. It seems realistic to have a 
multiplicity of views in the public arena when there are no state patrons who may 
influence the creative process.19  It is true that state involvement has always been 
considered a serious danger for autonomous creation, diversity and novelty in the sphere 
of culture. In the past times writers and artists used to be dependent on royal, feudal and 
church patronage for their livelihoods.20 Consequently, the state-supported approach 
could hardly be accepted as a means for fast and useful interchange of ideas, hence its 
many drawbacks to learning. Only writers, not obligated to government officials, can 
help breaking the standardized individual sensitivity and perception. Only these authors 
may encourage the pluralism, public culture and liberty, and broad-based citizen debate 
in the society.21 Thus the Framers decided to give a fiscal independence to authors, 
mostly because authors unconcerned with monetary remuneration would produce creative 
works and only publishers with no need for financial return would invest in selecting, 
packaging and making such expression available to the public. Without copyright law, 
creative expression would likely be both underproduced and underdisseminated.  This 
concern guided the framers to grant authors exclusive rights to their writings, which 
allowed them to receive an income while commercially exploiting their own works. As a 
                                                          
19 See Netanel supra note 3, at 291 
20 See id.  
21 See at 296 
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result, a market of copyright was established and started to function as a method to 
achieve an efficient allocation of current resources. 
      Economists usually characterize Intellectual property Law to which Copyright 
belongs as an attempt to cure a form of market failure.22 “Market failure” is related 
closely to the notion of public goods, which can be distinguished by two characteristics: 
once produced they are virtually inexhaustible and non-excludable as well. The market 
paradigm (which establishes an artificial scarcity of the products of mind through 
commodification) appears necessary to resolve the problem with the “free-riders” .It 
leads to “limited monopoly” granted to the author who can expect monetary 
compensation for his effort for the transactions referred to his legal rights. In that way the 
core ideas of the model of perfect competition, well explained by Adam Smith, are 
implemented in the copyright field. That makes it possible for the consumers (the public) 
through the pricing mechanism, to extract from the producers (authors) the maximum 
output for a given input.23 Since copyright owners receive a sufficient material reward 
they were believed not to impede the free flow of knowledge. The common 
understanding was that the author could use the benefits of copyright when did not reject 
its burdens. In perceiving one’s right as a copyright owner, one must respect the rights of 
the users including all members of society whose need of learning and obtaining 
information must be satisfied. For that, the contemporary view of copyright is one that 
promotes the limited statutory monopoly theory.24 The contrary assumption that 
copyright is a proprietary right leaves space for numerous misunderstandings in the area 
of copyright.  
                                                          
22 See Gordon, supra note 10, at 1610 
23 See id.  
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     By adopting the limited-grant principle, one can realize how copyright serves truly the 
public and accomplishes its notable purpose of learning. The significance of copyright is 
in the advancement and dissemination of culture and knowledge, a natural outcome of 
learning, thus constituting a major channel by which people are educated. In this context, 
copyright can be construed as a distinctive form of power with a variety of effects on all 
areas of social life.25 This is true because copyright law as a part of Intellectual Property 
law governs the access to information. Information appears to be an extremely important 
cultural and economic commodity.26 Since communication is important to all people, in 
our global electronic society today, this medium is essential.  
     Very often it is asserted that information is a primary good in the sense that each 
rational person is presumed to want it because it plays a crucial role in achieving one’s 
life plans and also because it decreases the uncertainty. Having information gives people 
more advantages and options for self-development. Information may be the most 
important primary good we can imagine when considering its role in the economy, the 
development of knowledge and culture as well as and also its impact on society. The 
significance of that commodity can be easily realized when one concentrates on the 
consequences of its imperfect distribution, examples being various prejudices.  
     The unique trait of information is that, once created, it can best be used when it is 
made available to all. It is well known that a democratic society cannot exist without 
having access to various information resources, thus the problem concerning the right of 
access to information is vital to each member of society. Usually, the holders of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 See Patterson and Lindberg, supra note 16, at 61 
25See generally Peter Drahos, A philosophy of Intellectual Property, 6,119 (1996) (Intellectual property 
rights create distinctive kinds of opportunities…They play a crucial role in constituting markets in 
information) 
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intellectual property rights are given the power to restrict such access to information. By 
allowing some individuals to control or own information and denying access to others, 
the belief is that more socially useful forms of information will be produced. Information 
can be viewed through different perspectives but it always relates to knowledge.27  
     As we have the chance to grow in an information society, we should be aware that this 
type of society imposes new criteria in placing value on information.  Specialized, 
theoretical knowledge is considered to be an active resource. This kind of resource refers 
to the intellectual tools that are necessary to produce further (knowledge-related) 
resources from raw, basic information. From that point of view, knowledge is closer to 
expertise, the higher intellectual ability to create new materials from knowledge itself. 28 
Obstacles preventing the free flow of information (construed in its new meaning) are able 
to greatly affect the progress in society. For example, the way that copyright is designed 
has a profound impact on the supply of books and other copyrighted material to different 
groups in the community. The education sector, the main producer of human capital, is 
naturally the main user of books and the supply of books to this sector is critical to the 
performance of its task-to educate people. That is why the copyright regime contains fair 
use provision that allow educational institutions to make use of books on more favorable 
terms than those given to private individuals.  
     These privileges granted to the education sector could be perceived as a way in which 
the goal of building up human capital is maintained while allowing the private copyright 
owner a reward for his efforts. If the education sector were not given such liberal access 
to works under copyright law, then it is likely that the social returns from the investments 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26 See Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual property Rights, 4 (2000) 
27Id. at 6 
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in education would not be so high. Unfortunately judges often disregard that interrelation 
and construe copyright as an exclusive and absolute right granted to the author.  Typical 
examples of this attitude include decisions relying on  “university coursepacks”. 
University coursepacks are anthologies of photocopied chapters from various textbooks. 
That topic is still being debated and courts are reluctant to see these coursepacks as 
necessary, affordable tools for knowledge.   
      In Basic Books .Inc v. Kinko's Graphics Corp. 29 the court discussed the issue of these 
customized photocopied anthologies created and sold by a for-profit copy shop to 
students. The plaintiff was a textbook publisher and the defendant was a nationwide chain 
of photocopy shops that offered the entitled service: ”Kinko’s Copies: Professor 
publishing”. The judges weighed the factors, which defined fair use and determined the 
coursepacks copied and produced by two Kinko's locations did not meet the statutory 
requirements for fair use. Despite the ruling in that case, shortly after that, the owner of 
MDS (Michigan Document Service), a commercial copyshop, continued to copy 
substantial amounts of copyrighted materials, to create coursepacks and to sell the packs 
to students.  The publishers then brought a suit alleging copyright infringement for 
impermissibly copying certain excerpted works for commercial purpose. The court 
reasoned that the copies were commercial in nature because they were copied by MDS 
for profit and not copied directly by students and teachers. The commercial nature of the 
copies weighed against fair use. The judges concluded that MDS had committed 
copyright infringement.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 Id. 
29 See   Basic Books, Inc v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp. 758 F. Supp. 152(  1991 ) 
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     The outcome of these two decisions did not help the process of learning and the spread 
of knowledge. To the contrary these judgments are manifestations that the courts support 
the copyright owner’s monopoly and lack objectivity in its considerations. The ultimate 
result in the academic sphere is that fewer people will be trained thus invoking 
inefficiencies in the use of existing human capital. The prevailing step in the publisher 
against the fundamental need of access to knowledge is a wrong direction because it does 
not take into account the doctrine of external effects and at the same time threatens to 
reduce information supply.  
     All intellectual property rights attribute some value to information as a subject of 
rights and obligations, but each type of right does this differently. Copyright is mainly 
concerned with the expression of information that complies with the statutory 
requirement of originality. An author can claim a copyright on many categories of 
creative expression, including literary works, audiovisual productions, computer 
software, graphic designs, musical arrangements, architectural plans, and sound 
recordings. According to the Copy right Act of 1976, a work is protected in all media and 
for all possible derivative uses as soon as it is fixed in a tangible medium of expression 
.As soon as a writer types a story on a computer or typewriter, the work carries the 
protection of copyright law. Originality is a fundamental principle of copyright and it 
implies that the author created the work through his or her own skill, labor, and judgment. 
“Thus, originality determines the boundaries of the copyright.”30  
     Although originality is an essential element to accord a protection to a work of 
authorship, it must not mislead us to believe that it implies either novelty or real artistic 
creativity. Two travelers may have made a chart of the same island or district, or two 
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reporters may have taken shorthand reports of the same speech. In each case there would 
be independent copyright. Copyright can be attached to both masterpieces and ordinary 
works Moreover, in an economy, which is based on technology -literature, art, and 
science can be employed in any technical application Literature may take the shape of a 
travel agent’s brochure, art becomes a handsomely designed hair dryer, science becomes 
a digital clock. So in principle any mass-produced article is copyrightable.  
     According to modern copyright theory, originality is reduced to the author’s freedom 
of choice.  All that is needed to satisfy both the U.S Constitution and the statute is for the 
author to contribute something more than a merely trivial variation. It must be something 
recognizably his/her own. In that context, originality means little more than a prohibition 
on actual copying. No matter how poor the author’s addition may be, it is enough if it is 
his /her own.31 What is the purpose to provide copyright protections to modestly aesthetic 
production, to works that do not embody exceptional intellectual conceptions or to works 
that comprise only of pure data? Is this necessary for the goals of copyright to be 
fulfilled? Under Alfred Bell’s minimalist and democratized vision of authorship, 
copyright doctrine offers no sound basis for distinguishing between oil paintings, art 
reproductions, motion pictures, lamp bases, poems, and inflatable plastic Santa Clauses. 
32 One of the possible justifications for the low originality standards might be that society 
needs numerous variations of works and cannot be pleased with only a limited number of 
creations, no matter how exceptionally creative and sophisticated they may be. That 
concept permits everyone of us to attempt to make a second “Mona Lisa” and claim a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 See Jessica Litman, The public domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965,975 (1990) 
31See  Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,Inc,191 F.2d 99( 1951 )at 102-03 
32 See  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.201 (1954)(lamp bases); Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. 
Supp. 940(1961) (Santa Clauses) 
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copyright over his work. In this regard one of the most prominent judges in the history of 
American copyright law is Judge Learned Hand who wrote in his earliest copyright 
opinion: ”While the public taste continues to give pecuniary value to a composition of no 
artistic excellence, the court must continue to recognize the value so created. Certainly 
the qualifications of judges would have to be very different from what they are if they 
were to be considered censors of the arts.”33 Based on this articulation, the inevitable 
death of the Romantic vision of authorship is evident.34 According to the romantic model, 
creative processes are magical and are therefore, likely to produce unique expression. The 
expression appears to be unique because the real author is using words, musical notes, 
shapes, or colors to clothe impulses that come from his singular inner being. This 
mysterious inner being may be a “store-house” of impressions, experiences, and works of 
other authors, but the author’s individual sensitivity converts the raw material into 
something distinguishable and unrecognizable. 35 
     According to the new modern version, an author is one who produces a  “work” when 
his/her abstractions receive physical manifestation in particular copy or copies. In that 
relation it is interesting to introduce the view of M.Twain who is famous as a master of 
the intricacies of copyright law. His elaboration on the copyright have played a great role 
and twisted the dominant American discourses of policy making. Mark Twain was able to 
recognize the flaws in the concept of the autonomous author and all its pretensions. 
Twain was a publisher and author, but also was a storyteller. Twain as author and 
Twain’s works are foundational to all the conflicts that complicate American copyright 
                                                          
33 See e.g. Siva Vaidhyanathan , Copyrights and copywrong The rise of Intellectual Property and how 
threatens creativity)105,(2001)) 
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law: originality and genius: piracy and plagiarism: European professional authorship and 
African storytelling. The ways Mark Twain constructed his journalism, fiction, and 
speaking careers demystify the notion of authorial originality. Many of the devices, 
characters, and events that he used in his fiction were lifted from others. Twain was not 
hung up on originality. He frequently alluded to other authors and works, and even to his 
own previous works, to signify on what had come before and to satirize flaws in literature 
and society. He was firmly embedded in storytelling tradition that lay outside the 
romantic assumption of authorial distinction. 36  
     The Romantic  “authorship” concept, which implies individual self-proprietorship, 
was replaced because seemed to be incompatible with the requirements of the new 
capitalist society. The new model insisted on a strong link between the author and his 
work, but this was likely to hinder the transferability of copyrighted works. The shift in 
legal reasoning regarding the idea of originality is obvious if we have a look at two main 
copyrighted cases. First in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 37 the Supreme 
Court emphasized on the individualistic artistic genius in a new technological context, as 
seen by the judges revealing their preference for the romantic conception of originality as 
an emanation of the author’s personality. 38 Second, in Bleistein v. Donaldson 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34See Jaszi,  Supra note 8, at 481( During the eighteenth century,” authorship” became intimately associated  
with  the Romantic movement in literature and art, expressing an extreme assertion of the self and the value 
of individual experience together with the sense of the infinite and the transcendental) 
35 See Jessica Litman, The Public domain, 39 Emory L.J.965, 1008(1990)  
36 See  Vaidhyanathan ,Supra note 33,at  57 
37 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v. Sarony, 111 U.S.53 (1884)(The issue in that case was whether a 
photograph had a human author or just was a product of a machine. The judges established that 
photographs were copyrightable.) 
38See Ginsburg , supra note 1,at 1930  (The keystone of originality,then,would no longer be the 
independence of the author’s labors,but the distinctiveness of the work’s conception or 
execution.Subjective judgement,rather than diligent collection,would be the locus of the work’s 
originality.)   
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Lithographing Co.39 the transformation of the copyright doctrine began and originality 
was gradually was pushed into the service of commerce.40 Naturally this disassociation of 
authorship from genius resulted in an intense commercialization of cultural production 
that was diffused in society. Today, works introduced to the public that are protected 
under copyright law tend to bear features of “mass” and “commercial” art contrary to few 
”fine art” productions.”41 This strategy can satisfy everyone and is also able to secure an 
adequate reward for the copyright owner. Nevertheless, it has been recognized that just as 
copyright protection extends to expression but not ideas, copyright protection extends 
only to artistic aspects, but not to mechanical or utilitarian features, of protected work. 
     Overall, copyright law is supposed to offer protection to the numerous and necessary 
sources of information in society. In other words, to claim a copyright, the author must 
prove that his/her piece of information is original but the requirement of originality is 
quite modest. If we try to enforce higher standards of originality, copyright may turn into 
a sort of patent with the degree of inventiveness and novelty as decisive factors. 
Assuming that the universe of creative expression is infinite, judges today assume 
originality for granted. “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside 
                                                          
39 See Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.239 (1903)(The Supreme Court upheld the 
copyrightablity of a circus advertising poster. It concluded that chromolithographs representing actual 
groups of persons and things, which have been designed from hints or descriptions of the scenes 
represented, and which are to be used as advertisements for a circus are “pictural illustrations” within the 
meaning of the statute.) 
40 See Jaszi ,Supra note 8,at  483 
41 See Bleinstein 88 U.S. at 251 (“Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their 
pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use-if use means to increase trade and to 
help to make money picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used 
for an advertisement. And if pictures may be used to advertise soap,or the theatre,or monthly magazines,as 
they are,they may be used to advertise a circus.Of course,the ballet is as legitimate a subject for illustration 
as any other.A rule cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the paintings of Degas.”) 
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of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” 42They do not try to determine whether and to 
what extent a plaintiff’s work is original since the “dissection “of the authorship process 
is practically impossible. May it is true that ”the concept of originality” is a poor 
substitute for tangible boundaries among parcels of intellectual property because it is 
inherently unascertainable. 43 From that perspective, the concept of originality is in the 
interest of legal certainty. The tolerance of copyright affords many similar works and that 
is in accordance with the public interest to have access to information. The effect is that 
society has a variety of works of authorship and through consensual transfers, can attain 
access to them. The private interests of copyright owners are also fulfilled as they receive 
a reward for putting their works on the market. 
    
                                                          
42 Id. at 251 
43See Litman, Supra note 30,at 974 (“We lack the capacity to ascertain the sources of individuals’ 
inspirations. Thus, the boundaries of copyright are inevitably indeterminate”) 
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CHAPTER III 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MARKET SYSTEM AND PROPERTY THEORIES IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
     The fundamental objectives of copyrights in literary and artistic property are like those 
in patents for industrial property: creative works produce social, cultural, and economic 
benefits that society wishes to secure. These works involve investment costs like time, 
training, materials, technology acquisition, etc. Moreover, marketing copyrighted 
products requires a costly investment that is more readily recouped given the greater 
certainty provided by protection .If other members of society were allowed to free ride on 
works without compensating their creators, the incentives to create would be severely 
diminished. The justification to implement a market system in the field of copyright is 
because we don’t want to minimize the number of original works. However, the existence 
of the market mechanism does not constitute a sufficient reason to believe that the 
ultimate purpose of copyright, namely to promote learning, will be achieved because a 
paradox is created by the economic rationale of copyright. Intellectual property rights, 
given to authors are deemed to be opportunities to gain remuneration in the market place. 
These remunerations act as incentives for them to produce new works that ensure the 
diffusion of information that benefits the society. “The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
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welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts". 
Sacrificial days devoted" to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with 
the services rendered."44 This may not be, or even only partially satisfied, because 
holders of intellectual property rights are provided with powers to restrict public access to 
information. This happens mainly when copyright becomes extremely expansive. When 
the author expects a big economic return for the publication of his/her works, he/she is 
willing to produce more and more works. At the same time, by increasing one’s 
monopoly, one limits the access to necessary elements for future works and ultimately 
their production.  
      Future authors have limited freedom to draw on earlier copyrighted works because 
time of their protection lasts for too long. If they want to produce competing works, they 
are obliged to ask for permission and pay fees to the earlier copyright owner. Naturally, 
later authors market their works with an increased price because they have to recoup their 
investment. This system evidences the market power of the copyright owner because the 
prior owner contracts who can duplicate his/her copyrighted works.   
     Subsequent author must do research whether to determine if he will be infringing on 
an owner’s rights and this is both costly and time consuming. In some cases, it is virtually 
impossible for a future author to exercise freely her/her own creativity. Extensive 
protection may stifle certain types of creative endeavors but some works, such as parody 
require pre-existing works so are not affected.  If the critic has to receive permission 
before writing his/her article, it would likely not be written for lack of such permission. 
Also, by requiring permission, a later author can copy certain elements from a 
copyrighted work, thus possibly leading to market failure. “The social value of 
                                                          
44 See e.g..Mazer v.Stein, .347 U.S.201 (1954) 
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information may be greater than the private market revenues it generates, because there 
may be market failures in creation of intellectual property .For example, the social value 
of an invention would exceed private revenues if there were positive consumption 
externalities, such as network effects from computer systems, software standards, or 
inoculations. Similarly, there is surplus social value whenever cost reductions spill over 
to other uses without market compensation. Examples here might be accounting systems 
and weather satellites.”45  
     Sometimes the transaction costs of negotiating and obtaining a license exceed the 
potential gains from the license. In similar cases, the later author will be unable to afford 
a license and the transaction will not occur, thus depriving society. Therefore, 
ramifications of market power are dangerous concerning the dissemination of 
information, especially for public interests.  If we assume that a copyrighted work is 
unique and no one is ever allowed to make use of it, the copyright owner will charge a 
higher price for access to his/her work and this monopoly will has two consequences: 
first, this market power will force those consumers willing to purchase the work at its 
higher, monopoly price, to pay more for the work than they would in a more competitive 
market. The second consequence is that this market power will coerce those consumers 
unable to pay the higher more monopoly price, to buy a less adequate substitute or do 
without. For these deprived consumers, broadening copyright protection imposes a 
deadweight loss. When copyright protection becomes too broad, the incentive to produce 
any given work, measured by the expected return, increases. At the same time, both the 
cost of creating new works and the deadweight loss associated with existing works also 
                                                          
45See e.g. Keith E.Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, 31 
(2000) 
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are raised. Therefore, the copyright system prevents others from marketing a perfect 
substitute for the original. Exploiting their market power, authors set an ultracompetitive 
price. To avoid creating an undue deadweight loss, copyright must limit the extent of the 
market power that copyright can create. Copyright must ensure that future authors can 
copy those elements from an earlier copyrighted work in order to produce reasonable 
substitutes for earlier works. The more copyright permits a future author to duplicate the 
original, the more it limits the market power associated with the work's copyright.46 
     It is generally agreed that marketing is an integral part of the entire production. 
Without some anticipation that goods will be successfully sold at prices yielding a profit, 
the act of production will not be undertaken.  In order for copyright to exist, creators must 
be sufficiently compensated, or they will seek another alternative. Creation and 
production imply costs to the creator and if intellectual property is not protected from 
piracy in the market, then as soon as the first unit of the delivered good appears in the 
market, it will be illegally copied and sold to the public for a fraction of the cost. The 
final result will be that the copies will compete with the originals in the market but will 
have an unfair advantage in cost and will undermine the profits of the author who will not 
receive a sufficient compensation. However, under a system of legal protection (i.e. it is 
illegal to reproduce, and financial penalties are levied on copiers if they are caught) while 
it is unlikely that reproduction will completely stop certainly the marginal cost of 
reproduction is increased. The royalty that must be paid to the creator increases the 
marginal cost of production and distribution.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
46 See  e.g. Glynn S.Lunnen, Reexamining Copyright's Incentives -Access Paradigm,49 Vand.L.Rev 483 
563( 1996) 
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     Some scholars question whether intellectual property really needs a market to exist. 
They take the position that regime that foster innovation and creativity can and do emerge 
through the market process without legislative or judicial intervention. The legal system 
of a free society, based on the right to self-ownership and the voluntary transfer of 
alienable rights, allows entrepreneurs to generate solutions to problems that many 
consider to be intractable. The economic incentives facing actual market participants 
offer greater inducements to creativity than do the idle curiosity or speculation of the 
academics who study them. Violating rights of self-ownership and control over tangible 
alienable property that grounds the market system in pursuit of elusive efficiency gains is 
ultimately inconsistent with economic efficiency and the free market. From that point of 
view the patents and copyrights are both deliberately state-created monopolies that did 
not emerge through common law or otherwise spontaneous legal processes, thus are 
unjustifiable interventions in voluntary market processes. 47This concept is derived from 
the understanding that the legal system is an order derived from the adjudication of 
individual claims rather than from a public policy.  It is implied that there may be natural 
market mechanisms that would provide adequate remuneration to creators, thus it is 
considered that the markets function in the absence of enforceable intellectual property 
rights. Although many innovations are not accorded copyright or patent protections they 
are nevertheless produced on the market. Some of the most valuable unprotected ideal 
objects include marketing strategies, scientific principles discoveries of naturally 
occurring substances, jokes and magic tricks, new words and slogans, useful mental 
process etc. However, most cultural creations are not naturally protected because second 
comers may appropriate their value through low-cost duplication and distribution, with 
                                                          
47 See id. . Moore, Supra note 14,at 199 
 25
 
little or no investment in mastering the underlying creative effort. Indeed, free-riding 
competitors focus their efforts on those creations that had proven success in the market 
place thus simultaneously reducing the returns to the original. 
The market power of the copyright owner is linked with his rational interest, 
which contradicts  the right, and need of learning of every one of us. That contradiction 
exists because copyright owners frequently are inclined to think of themselves as owners 
of a proprietary right, thus preventing the optimal use of their works.48 The existence of 
property rights has an axiomatic link with ownership. Ownership normally accrues to the 
expenditure of effort,  whatever manner and effort is encouraged through the prospective 
rewards to be gained. In that way property rights are granted to those who have worked 
on the improvement of any particular object, even if the object has been transferred 
afterwards to another owner along with its attached rights. This requires both ownership 
of one’s efforts as well as the alienability of their product. The ownership protects the 
individual from the unreasonable rights of interest of others in society and from state 
intervention in their lives.49 The notion of copyright suggests that ideas and knowledge 
can be parceled into separable and transferable objects, which enjoy similar 
characteristics to material property. The author creates an idea but he should be able to 
transfer the knowledge to someone for an adequate reward. The idea to attach property 
features to abstract matters is not new because abstract property has existed for centuries. 
Shares in a company, commodity futures, and even paper money are forms of property 
that are mostly abstract. 50Some scholars do not agree that all intellectual property rights 
                                                          
48 Id at 21 
49 See May,supra note 26,at 26 
50See  Richard Stallman , Innovation and information environment:Reevaluating Copyright:The Public 
must prevail,75 Or .L.Rev 291294 ,(1996) 
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can be brought unproblematically into economic and social relations on the same basis as 
material property. The central element in the spontaneous emergence of property rights is 
scarcity, or the possibility of conflicting uses. When we apply the property rights analysis 
to ideal objects, there is a lack of scarcity. “If nature has made any one thing less 
susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power 
called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to 
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone, 
and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.  Its peculiar character, too, is that no one 
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea 
from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine: as he who lights his taper 
at mine, receives light without darkening me.” 51 It is a common feature of intellectual 
property rights that they are not a consequence of scarcity because they are the deliberate 
creation of statutory law. Immaterial goods can be easily multiplied and can be made 
scarce only by law. It has to be recognized that copyright “wears the property label 
uneasily”.52 The very nature of intellectual objects “grounds a strong prima facie case 
against the wisdom of private and exclusive intellectual property rights”. 53 As the 
Supreme Court has stated, ”the copyright owner holds no ordinary chattel”.54 We can 
justify a person’s right to exclude others from possessing and using a physical object 
when such exclusion is necessary for one’s possession and unhindered use. It seems that 
                                                          
51 See Moore, supra note 14, at 349 (The citation belongs to Thomas Jefferson as a part of his letter to Isaac 
McPherson, Monticello, 1813) 
52See L.Ray Patterson, Copyright and “the exclusive Right” of Authors, 1.J.Intell.Prop.L.1 37 
(1993)(“Proprietary concepts are detrimental to the purpose of copyright, the promotion of learning.) 
53 See Moore ,Supra note 14,at 25 
54 See  United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207,225(1985) (The Supreme Court held that the National 
Stolen property Act(18 USCS 2314) was not applicable to the interstate transportation of “bootleg” 
phonorecords that are manufactured and distributed without the consent of the copyright owners of the 
musical compositions performed on the records) 
 27
 
the proprietary view of copyright serves only private interests because it provides owners 
with power to control the use of their works. Generally, property gives a right of control 
It is often asserted that property has emerged because humans had an interest to control 
different elements of the surrounding environment. That what most encouraged the legal 
construction of property was the desire to control the actions of others in respect to the 
objects of property. 
     The proprietary concept has its origin in the natural- law copyright doctrine. Copyright 
is deemed to be more than a property right according to that theory. It is a natural-law 
property, which implies the idea that it is, or should be, an absolute right. 55One of the 
most popular justifications for this theory lies in the presumption that the author obtains a 
right for his creative labor, known as the creative-work theory. J.Locke for the first time 
has articulated the theory regarding the “labor model”. 56In his path-breaking work “Two 
Treatises of Civil government”(first published in 1690) he forwarded a theory of 
intellectual property rights inherent in manual works and creations. The application of 
Locke’s theory to the productions of books was the first attempt to displace the 
intellectual property rights from publishers to authors. He considered that persons had a 
natural right of property in their bodies. Owning their bodies, he believed, people also 
own the labor of their bodies and the fruits of their labor Locke thinks that until labored 
on, objects have little human value and at one point suggests that labor creates 99 % of 
their is value. It not easy to agree on the theory that ownership allows a person, as against 
all other persons in the world, to appropriate things to him/her self by the expenditure of 
labor without any limitations. “Property may look to be an individualistic institution, but 
                                                          
55 See   Patterson and Lindberg, supra note 16, at 119 
56  See. Moore, Supra note 14, at 21 
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the very nature and definition of the right seems to require some collective social 
institution to lie at its base. No natural act can legitimate a social claim to property.” 57 In 
considering the nature of the creative works, one can hardly say that all of their value is 
attributable to the labor of the author. It is difficult to accept the idea that a work of 
imagination is to be treated as a product belonging only to the writer himself even though 
the work is an extension of his/her personality. One must not forget that intellectual 
activity is not a creation ex nihilio. Inventions, writings and thoughts do not operate in a 
vacuum If one assumes that authorship is a product of astigmatic repackaging of others’ 
expression, one cannot take the proprietary theory seriously because all works of 
authorship, even the most creative, include some elements adapted from raw material that 
the author first encountered in someone else’s works. 58Nobody is able to create a work 
without using previous knowledge one accumulated in one’s lifetime.59Thus it seems 
unfair to let a single creator have complete power over his/her work because allowing this 
would ignore the vast contributions of others. Perhaps many former contributors are no 
longer present but that it is not a good reason to allow the last laborer to receive full 
credit from this joint task.  
     For John Locke, property rights are held against others and exist only by virtue of 
their place in social relations or “civil society” while for Hegel, civil society is essentially 
the market and its legal framework .In Hegel’s view property is not absolute, in the sense 
that it can be used without limit. Contrary to that, property must be legally established by 
                                                          
57 See e.g. Richard A.Epstein Possession as the root of title,{ 13 Ga .L.Rev. 1221} (1979) 
58 See Litman supra note 30,at 1010 
59 Knowledge is nothing but a vast accretion of incremental additions- a lot of “pieces” which being 
gathered form our capacity to think, reflect and act. Everybody has to make efforts to create his own world 
of knowledge. Doing that, one uses resources, which have been introduced to the mankind a long time ago 
by the predecessors. All former creations are open to use and there should be no restrictions to contact with 
them. The progress will vanish if we are deprived by some reason of that possibility. 
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the laws of society where it is owned. Unlike Locke’s model, property is entirely a legal 
construct because it is part of an individual’s appropriation of things needed to support 
the self and is sanctioned through the practices of the state. 60 According to Karl Marx, 
the concept of property becomes the mechanism for removing the self from the individual 
through work (through alienation) rather than its reflection. Property denies an 
individual's self through an act of alienation.  Marx believed that a creative worker 
couldn’t enjoy the fruits of his production in a capitalist society, due to the division of 
labor in industry and the alienation of effort required to earn the exchange value of one’s 
labor. 61Marx points out two main characteristics of work alienation: first, the worker 
who has sold his/her labor power to the capitalist is related to the product of his labor as 
to an alien object which exists outside the self independently; secondly alienation is 
found in the act of production within the labor process.62 Due to that the worker is unable 
to work creatively, his work is not the satisfaction of a need, but merely a means to 
satisfy needs external to it. Ownership and control are vested in the capitalist who decides 
what is to be produced, how much and in what way. The theory behind Marxism is 
related to alienation and property. In his view private property is not only the product, but 
                                                          
60 See May , supra note 26, at 26,27 
61  Id. At 27 
62 See generally Ernst Fischer, How to read Karl Mar(1996) (According to Marx’s theory, labor had to 
become a multiple activity’divided into many separate ones: for no individual and no community limited in 
place and time was capable of doing what mankind as a whole was called upon to do. That is why labour 
evolved a multitude of one-sided activities.The division of labor destroyed unity,created and reinforced 
social inequality.Marx distinguishes between the social division of labor and the division of labor in 
manufacture as these two categories overlap and interlink. The personal relationship of the craftsman to his 
product first began to change with the manufacturing systems in which division of labor began to 
predominate. But the later introduction of machinery led to a radical depersonalization of the worker. Thus 
labor in its historical development becomes the negation of its own principle, that of creative activity 
through which man makes himself: instead ,man makes himself into an accessory of the machine, a partial 
function in the mechanism of the instruments of labor which dominate him.The division of labor was bound 
to lead to the division of common property and the transition to private ownership Marx predicted that in 
that new world the objects. appropriated by man, acquire the crazy power of owning men. The face of man 
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also the result and the necessary consequence of alienated labor. Later this relationship 
becomes reciprocal: private property is the product of alienated labor and the means 
whereby labor alienates itself. In the world of copyright, the creation of works is not like 
every work process for it is a creative and mostly independent process. The author is 
linked to his creation abstractly and does not find the product of his labor to be hostile. 
However, when this product is turned into a commodity for market exchange, the authors 
‘endeavors are dissolved in society. The author seems to have earned via his/her labor 
and efforts, property –he has become from knowledge creator an owner. It is claimed that 
no individual would work if there was no reward linked to property as a result of one’s 
effort. The ownership of property is how an individual in society is able to maintain and 
protect the freedom on which selfhood depends. Finally, property is a fundamental right 
to which free individuals are entitled to and intellectual property provides for no 
exceptions. One of the significant advantages of property rights is that they are easily 
transferred. The transfer of property allows the original creator-owner to realize an 
appropriate monetary reward in a market society. In that way the property reward 
encourages the efforts of individuals and that is instrumental in encouraging human 
endeavors. As stated earlier, intellectual property rights construct scarcity to ensure that 
market relations in knowledge objects can be undertaken. The main reason to be 
suspicious about the advantages of the legal construction of intellectual property is the 
power that usually comes from the ownership and control established through its 
institutions. Nevertheless, the commodification of knowledge is said to be an inescapable 
process. One major reason being is the invasion of a capitalist society that has deepened 
                                                                                                                                                                             
will disappear behind the merchant’s social character mask. The community of competition, the trading 
society will manifest itself as estrangement and alienation.) 
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“its penetration into previously non-commodified social relations”.63  Intellectual 
property rights enable the expansion of capitalism into areas regarded as a realm outside 
direct exchange relations. The objective is to bridle knowledge into a set of property 
relations. Under capitalism norms, there is little that cannot be perceived in one way or 
another as property, like the need to earn profit in order to reproduce capital. These 
principles have a peculiar reflection on copyright as well. In order to guarantee maximum 
production and distribution of works of authorship, society should accord ” commodity 
status” to knowledge and treat it as property. Consequently, knowledge is turned into an 
element of a market system where it can be transferred and passed to those who would 
value it most by paying a price. Material property is considered to be particularly scarce, 
while knowledge naturally is not constrained in that manner. Therefore, protection 
afforded by copyright law artificially converts the status of knowledge from a public 
good into a private good by making it exclusive. This enables the creators to capture at 
least some of the public value of their works while preserving an incentive to invest in a 
socially optimal system of legal protection. Then, the creators permit others to make 
specific uses of their works in exchange for a royalty payment .In this way, the existence 
of a copyright allows intellectual property to be marketed and consumed efficiently. 
     There are arguments that the relation between intellectual property and material 
property is analogous to that between leasehold and freehold. 64The leasehold can be 
viewed as a useful model for recognizing the distinction between material and intellectual 
property. Scholars make a connection between material property and intellectual property 
by focusing on the issue of time constraints. Leasehold is a model that emphasizes 
                                                          
63 See May ,supra note 52.at 12 
64Id at  54,55  
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limited temporal existence while limited intellectual property rights are similar to the 
division between leaseholder and freeholder. It is clear they are both legal rights, which 
cannot be enjoyed in perpetuity, and their life span is limited. Leaseholds seem to be 
appropriate as they split the ownership of the relevant property into at least two parts. The 
lease is a time-limited contract transfers the right to use the property or part of it, in a 
clearly defined way from the freeholder or owner to the leaseholder. Leases consist of 
conditions on use and responsibilities for the maintenance of the property. When we 
compare it to intellectual property, one finds the lease is also limited regarding the period 
to which the rights to use are granted. It is known that leaseholders are able to purchase, 
for a period of time, a set of rights, which the freeholder enjoys. This parallels the 
possibility to transfer the right to exploit intellectual property while the author is still able 
to think through his idea. Moreover, the nature of knowledge presupposes that the author 
will retain the idea, even if he/she has assigned the right of use in economic terms to 
someone else. When the right to publish is transferred to the publisher, the author keeps 
the expressed ideas in his/her mind, to use them in his future creative and mental 
activities as long as the manner of expression differs. Also, when the leasehold agreement 
ends, the ownership of the right to use the property reverts to the freeholder but they are 
exclusive and can be transferred again to another subsequent leaseholder.  Rights 
accorded to intellectual property owners are no longer exclusive when their term expires 
and they enter the public realm. When comparing the models of leaseholds and that of 
intellectual property, differences exist in the scarcity of the leased object. When scarcity 
is referred to the leasehold, it remains unaffected while for intellectual property scarcity 
has yet to be legally constructed. Thus, although the relation between a legitimized form 
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of property and intellectual property seems attractive, the differences between the two 
forms of property are still significant.65  
     The actual economic and social organization of modern society is to maintain and 
expand wide spread recognition of the legitimacy of all intellectually property. The 
arguments purporting this view focus on efficiency and utility since a market only based 
on property rights can ensure efficient allocation. So knowledge must be thought as a 
property to enjoy the benefits of market allocation. Commodifying knowledge through its 
characterization, as property appears to be dangerous. 66  To believe that all property is 
subject to similar treatment without regard to specific characteristics is not justifiable. 
Copyright does not occupy only the market place but it also performs another role of 
promoting culture and learning.67 If one only concentrates on the economic aspects of 
copyright, one will miss its social purpose and it will turn into a chase after profit. To put 
a label of property on knowledge and information implies a legal constraint on their flow 
to the public. Our global information society requires new methods to treat knowledge 
because its use of that resource fundamentally differentiates it from previous systems of 
capitalism. Moreover, it is worth noting that the monopoly granted by copyright is not 
designed to ensure the maximum economic reward. The judges are wrong when they take 
into consideration only the commercial aspects of copyright law. Everything today is 
based on the commercial exchange of goods and services but the purpose of copyright is 
idealistic as it refers to learning, science, education and culture.  Thus the judgments must 
                                                          
65 See May supra note 52,at 56 
66 See Vaidhyanathan, Supra note 33,at 15 "Copyright should be about policy, not property…. The goal of 
the entire copyright system should be to recognize the pernicious repercussions of restricting information, 
yet to reward stylistic innovation. To foster fertile creativity, we should avoid the rhetorical traps that 
spring up when we regard copyright as "property" instead of "policy"  
67 See Patterson &Lindberg, Supra note 16, at 49,238 (Copyright was never intended to create and 
guarantee profit, only to protect the work in the marketplace. Users also have rights.) 
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reflect the rights of users and that is possible only when copyright is perceived as a 
regulatory concept, not as a proprietary one. The rights of users exist to respond to the 
increasing need of learning. Justices sometimes see the goal of copyright as only entailing 
a means to deter infringement and are inclined to decide copyright cases by ignoring the 
main policy, namely -to stimulate the development of science and art. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESTRICTIONS OF COPYRIGHT OWNER'S MONOPOLY 
 
     Copyright should be recognized more as a regulatory concept, which has come into 
existence in order to link the natural need of an author to receive a gain for his efforts and 
the inherent need of a person to learn. Only a positive concept is able to accommodate 
these natural rights.68 Copyright is a conditional statutory grant, which has emerged not 
as a reward for the labor of the author but because of his consent to make his work 
available to the public. "The social benefit rationale justifies copyright not with respect to 
each work individually, but with respect to an overall system of production of works".69 
It is held that the reading and listening by the public is paramount. Copyright exists for 
users and not vice versa therefore public considerations deserve exceptional attention. 
Copyright is truly created as a bargain with the public as it involves giving up specific 
freedoms and retaining others where the public trades certain rights in exchange for 
access to more published works the design of copyright takes into account the rights of 
the users who need to communicate with the authors’ works. The law of users is 
considered to be an essential component of copyright law today. 70Without the law of 
users public communication would be impeded and people would not have access to the 
rich store of accumulated wealth in knowledge and ideas. The rights of users note that 
copyright exists not to prevent, but to facilitate, the exchange of ideas and information. 
                                                          
68 See  Patterson Supra note 52  at 26 
69 See  Ginsburg  Supra note 1,at 1899 
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By limiting the scope of the proprietary entitlement, copyright seeks to preserve rich 
possibilities for critical exchange and diverse reformulation of existing works. This is a 
condition for  “deliberation and robust debate” in society because these traits are regarded 
to be the essence of a democratic culture.71 Influence of an authors’ works on public 
opinion is compelling and must not be underestimated for literature and art though subtle 
are powerful vehicles for changing attitudes change or reinforcement of policies. 
Therefore, copyright owners must act in a way, which allows the broadest 
communication of their works. They should also acknowledge that limits on their rights 
exist because copyright is an engine of the progress of knowledge and learning. Authors 
must be tolerant to the needs of others who want to attain knowledge, which is possible 
only by permitting broad access. When a work of art or science, is exposed to a diverse 
audience, it inevitably provokes a dialogue and the dialogue is a spur for further 
creations. The intensive exchange of ideas and opinions appears to be an incentive for 
creativity, therefore the purpose of copyright is not only to put ideas and information 
conveyed by a work in the public domain but also to permit these ideas to be fully 
utilized by allowing others to build upon them. This is a prerequisite for progress in 
society The more messages we receive in the form of books, musical compositions, films 
and other works of authorship, the greater the chance for people to become future 
creators. If copyright owners neglect this obvious truth, they put at stake the mission of 
humanity-namely to progress from the acquisitions of past skills and knowledge. There is 
an important connection between copyright and culture where culture is mostly defined 
                                                                                                                                                                             
70 See  generally, Patterson and Lindberg, Supra note 16, 
71See  Netanel, supra note 3, at 290 
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by one’s contacts with the world of science and art. 72  If copyright owners misunderstand 
their rights, they may hinder our cultural sensitivity and growth while depriving people 
from intellectual food. One guarantee that copyright will never be an undue obstacle to 
learning is because private use generally is permitted when discussing copyrights. This 
consists of using a work for one’s own learning, enjoyment, or sharing with a friend like 
copying, but the exception is that the copy is neither for public distribution or sale to 
others nor a functional substitute for a copyrighted work, currently available on the 
market at a reasonable price. Private use is also limited to a single copy not intended for 
distribution. The user who goes beyond these limitations must resort to fair use criteria 
(to be explained later) to determine the appropriateness of the use. The rule of personal 
use is appropriate only when the motivation for the use is learning in the constitutional 
sense, not to avoid a purchase that could otherwise be made. Aside from personal use, 
copyright law recognizes fair use, a privilege from which the utilitarian justification of 
the copyright emanates. It is a valuable achievement of copyright law that contributes to 
the promotion of learning and culture.  
     There must be certain restrictions on the copyright monopoly but one must avoid the 
reluctance of the author to produce further creations. Fair use should not be perceived as 
an unorganized group of exceptions to the rules of copyright, nor as a departure from the 
most the principles governing this law, but rather as a rational and integral part of 
copyright, whose observance is necessary to achieve the law’s objectives.73 Fair use 
“offers a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright holder with the public’s 
                                                          
72 See e.g. M. Adler and Ch.V.Doren, Great Treasury of Western Thought", 528 (1977)(Culture is activity 
of thought,and receptiveness to beauty and humane feeling.Scraps of information have nothing to do with 
it.What we should aim at producing is men who possess both culture and expert knowledge in some special 
 38
 
interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such as art, 
science and industry”.74 Fair use also guarantees an important “ breathing space within 
the confines of copyright”.75 Any fair use analysis “involves a difficult balance between 
the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and 
discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, 
information, and commerce on the other hand.”76  The judges have promulgated the fair 
use doctrine for the first time in Folsom v. Marsh but the term was precisely defined for 
the first time in Lawrence v. Dana77. For many years before the first decision, copyright 
owners were tempted to equalize the use of one work and the use of the copyright, which 
is conferred on it. With the decision in Folsom v. Marsh, 78 the judges resolved the 
problem and the doctrine of fair use was created. The judicially developed "fair-use " 
exception presents a concept, that remains "the most troublesome in the whole law of 
copyright’. It is generally agreed that fair use should be found when the benefit from the 
non-permissive use of the work outweighs the possibility that allowing the use will 
discourage creation of such works. The law will excuse a person who appropriates certain 
material from a work so long as the appropriated material is used in a way that benefits 
the public without usurping the market for the first work. Problems arise because the 
public for which this exception has been created is not a party at copyright infringement 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dierection.Their expert knowledge will give them the ground to start from,and their culture will lead them 
as deep as philosophy and as high as art." Whitehead  in "Aims of education") 
73 See. Pierre N.Leval ,Toward a fair use standard, {103 Harv.L.Rev.1105},1107(1990) 
74 See Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F. 2d. 91(1977) 
75See  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,Inc., 114 S.Ct.1164 (1994) 
76 See  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
77 See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.Cas. 26,60 ( 1869) 
78 See Folsom , 9 F. Cas. at 345  
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cases.79The tension, which usually exists between public interests and the interests of the 
copyright owner, reaches its culmination. The whole development of the doctrine has 
been influenced by the contradiction between the direct aim of the copyright privilege to 
grant the owner a right from which he can reap financial benefit and the more 
fundamental purpose of the promotion the progress of science and the useful arts .The 
supreme Court has stated that ” Copyright law like the patent statutes, makes reward to 
the owner a secondary consideration." 80 To serve the constitutional purpose,” courts in 
passing upon particular claims of infringements must occasionally subordinate the 
copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the greater public interest in 
the development of art, science and industry". 81 Whether the privilege may justifiably be 
applied to particular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials, like whether 
their distribution would serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information 
and whether their preparation requires some use of prior materials dealing with the same 
subject matter. Consequently, the privilege has been applied to works in the fields of 
science law, medicine, history and biography."82  
     All these decisions clearly demonstrate that although the fair use doctrine may be 
malleable, its application must be compatible with the constitutional justification of 
copyright law. Fair use permits and requires the courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute; especially when they encounter a danger concerning creativity which 
                                                          
79 See  Anna M. Budde, Photocopying for research: A Fair use exception favoring the progress of science 
and the useful arts ,{42 Wayne L.Rev.1999,} 2000(1996) 
80 See Mazer  347 U.S. at 203  
81See  Berlin v. E.C Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541(1963) 
82See. Rosemont Enters.,Inc, v. Random House,366 F. 2d 303,308( 1966)(Howard Hughes, having 
purchased through the Rosemont corporation the copyright on articles concerning his life, sought to restrain 
a biographer’s use of articles. The fair use defense was upheld in part because the court found that the 
plaintiff there was acting in bad faith seeking to prevent the publication of a legitimate biography of 
Howard Hughes) 
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copyright law must foster. Although no consistent definition of fair use one can use in 
every case has ever been developed, a common definition of is a "privilege in others than 
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without 
his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner (by the copyright).83 It is 
obvious that the definition is vague, unhelpful, and as the court has stated. What is fair 
use depends upon many circumstances. One is more likely to agree that fair use is "rule 
of reason" fashioned by judges to balance the author's right to compensation for his work, 
on the one hand, against public interest in having the widest possible dissemination of 
ideas and information, on the other hand.84 Some consider fair use to be an affirmative 
defense, which places the burden on the plaintiff to prove that there is no infringement if 
his copying involves only unpredictable elements such as ideas, processes, facts, or if 
only unsubstantial quantities are referred to. One reason why this doctrine is so confusing 
is the problem in answering the question "Who may use fair?" The statutes only imply an 
answer but law does not work with implications. Since its beginnings, the doctrine has 
been refined and clarified by many decisions. Finally, it was codified with the enactment 
of the 1976 Copyright Act. When determining whether the defense of fair use applies, the 
courts must consider several factors.85 The statute does not indicate how much weight has 
                                                          
83See id.  303,309  
84 We should point that there is a difference in the treatment of the ‘fair use” doctrine in the continental 
system compared to the American system. The continental system views copyright, as a natural right and 
consequently fair use is an exception, which must be construed narrowly. Since the continental system 
embraces the individualistic approach, it does not emphasize on the enhancing of the public interest 
through ‘fair use”. 
85See 17 U.S.C.,Sect.107 (1976) ( “In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is 
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include:1.The purpose and the character of the use, including 
whether such use is of commercial nature or it is non -profit educational purpose 2.the nature of the 
copyrighted work 3.the amount and the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work 3.the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”) 
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to be accorded to each factor but the judges usually emphasize the forth factor.86 They 
usually do not take seriously the first three factors as these are considered to be relatively 
empty propositions. Paradoxically, the doctrine of equitable reason has become a doctrine 
of inequitable reasoning because the focus has been on the rights of the copyright owner, 
not on public interest. 
     Fair use analysis traditionally has been directed to competitor actions thus courts tend 
to emphasize the eventual economic injury resulting from the competitive use. This is 
justified by the well-spread theory that copyright is a statutory unfair competition.  
Constructive competition is competition, which motivates people to make efforts. 
Competition becomes a combat when competitors start with attempts to impede each 
other instead of advancing themselves toward "fair play". The principle "Let the best man 
win" gives way to "Let me win best or not".  This implies that intellectual property rights 
are sometimes said to be monopoly rights. Monopoly is not a moral evil, but there are 
economic grounds for not encouraging its development. The standard economic objection 
to it is that it causes a dead weight loss. The economic problem with monopolies is that 
the "unmet consumer demand is not compensated for by a gain to producers and so the 
total benefit of the monopoly market is less than the total benefit of the competitive 
market."87When copyright owners object to fair use on an unreasonable basis, the harm to 
society is twofold: first it prevents subsequent authors to make a reasonable use of their 
works and second, they prevent the use by consumers. The current position of many 
scholars today is that there is a danger for fair use as inhibiting learning. Doctrine was 
originally created to apply to competitors, not consumers. When Joseph Story formulated 
                                                          
86See Nimmer,3 Nimmer on Copyright &13.05(b)(4) ,13-54 (1978)(The famous scholar also takes the 
position that the forth factor is the most important) 
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the doctrine for the first time in Folsom v. Marsh, the copying involved printing and 
publishing by a competitor. The issue here was about the paraphrasing of 4,5 percent of 
the plaintiff’s work which the defendant used for creating an artificial autobiography of 
President Washington. Justice Story did not accept the fair use argument since he 
believed “the entirety of the copyright is the property of the author; and it is no defense, 
that another person has appropriated a part, and not the whole, of any property. It is 
obvious that his judgment was influenced by the property theory. Also, Justice Story took 
the position that copyright plays an important role in the dissemination of writings since 
without it, publishers would not have been willing to invest in publishing authors works 
when a rival bookseller might republish them, either in the same, or in a cheaper form. 
He thought that the exclusive copyright could encourage the publication. This proves that 
copyright’s objective is to stimulate the dissemination, not the creation of the work. The 
dissemination is necessary to assure access since access creates opportunities for 
learning. However, in the discussed case the court held that the defendant had infringed 
the plaintiff's copyright. “The consumer's absence from the fair use equation was not 
coincidental."88 A consumer's use of the work was not considered to be contrary to 
copyright unless it is converted into competitive use. Nowadays, fair use has been 
expanded to encompass the learning function of copyright hence some interpret the 
doctrine as a device to increase the monopoly of the copyright owner at the expense of 
those who have a desire to learn. The litigants in copyright infringement cases are often 
competitors and for that statutory monopoly law should protect the owner against them. 
The original intention when adopting the doctrine was to allow subsequent authors to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
87 See Drahos, Supra note 25, at 145,146 
88 See Patterson, Supra note 5, at 39 
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make reasonable use of a copyrighted work. Therefore, the court carefully must 
determine whether the appropriation in fair use cases is reasonable and customary.89 For 
example, in Triangle Publications, Inc v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers90, the court did not 
recognize the right of the plaintiff, a publisher of TV Guide to prohibit the defendant's 
use of some information despite the fact that it was competitive use. The defendant which 
publishes the Miami Herald Newspaper decided to promote a newly developed booklet 
which was to be included as a supplement to the Sunday Edition of the paper source. 
Although the TV Guide covers, reproduced by the. Defendant were competing products 
.the court held that the public as well as the newspaper benefits from comparative 
advertising, thus minimizing the importance of a commercial use was involved .The court 
did not allow the competition to become a combat in that case. 
      In the first sentence of section 107, Congress expressly recognized certain uses that 
benefit the public to the degree necessary to qualify for protection as fair use, including 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. Fair use is not, however, limited to the 
examples given, rather the examples provide direction in determining what other kinds of 
uses may qualify as fair. The first factor of a fair-use evaluation, the purpose and the 
character of the use, may weigh in favor of the alleged infringer if the use is one of those 
enumerated in the first sentence of section 107,or a use similar to one of them, or a 
                                                          
89 See e.g.Holdredge v.Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921(1963) "Some use of the plaintiff's book 
as a source for an article on Mammy Pleasant as an historical personage could certainly be termed fair. But 
not only is defendant's article based in large part on plaintiff's work,it mirrors the manner and style in 
which the plaintiff chose to set down the factual and historical material she used,and to express her 
thoughts and conclusions.Such an extensive use is well outside the scope of the concept of Fair use,being 
neither reasonable nor customary,and the defendants can not avail themselves of this defense) 
90 See e.g. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 455 F.Supp. 875(1978) 
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transformative use. 91 Judge Leval in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.92, revealed his 
definition of transformative use: transformative work “lies at the heart of the fair use 
doctrine ‘s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright and the more 
transformative the new work, the less likely will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that weigh against a finding of fair use.” That is an emphasis on the 
central role of fair use. A noncommercial, nonprofit use also weighs in favor of fair use. 
If none of these apply, then copying of a commercial nature tends to lead to a finding of 
copyright infringement. The court usually has to estimate the strength of the secondary 
user’s justification against factors favoring the copyright owner. We should underline the 
importance of the research use and discuss how the courts tend to analyze it. Because the 
specific use contributes much to the learning function of copyright, research is considered 
to be a paradigmatic example of fair use, which is most often met in a university context. 
Since universities prepare the future leaders of society, it is essential to pay attention to 
that particular academic use of copyrighted materials. Although copyright policy at first 
glance sees to be friendly to academic freedom, some court decisions cast doubts on the 
idea because judges are too willing to apply the neoclassical economic view of copyright 
in the academic sphere. The ramifications of importing these principles and using them in 
judging the value of academic contribution to knowledge can be dangerous. Some 
authors ague that a neoclassical economic justification for copyright is inappropriate 
when applied to the university mission to promote learning.93 We know that copying of 
journal articles take place every day at universities in the whole country and it has been 
                                                          
91 See e.g. Salinger v. random House,Inc., 811 F.2d 90(1986)(See to what extent the challenged use is 
transformative ) 
92 See  Campbell,114  S.Ct. at 1164  
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recognized as a important activity which brings a minimal harm to the copyright owner 
compared to the public benefits derived from it. In American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco 94 the Supreme Court found that photocopying articles, that was necessary for 
conducting scientific research was a copyright infringement. The publishers sued not 
because they objected to the research but because the photocopies would deprive them of 
additional sales. However, in that way did not demonstrate a respect to the mission of the 
scientists and that act was a vote against learning. The Supreme court believed that while 
the research was valuable and beneficial to the public, the commercial sponsorship wiped 
out any advantage that may have accrued under the first factor of fair use, being the 
purpose and character of the use.95  “If that practice persists, the authors and the 
publishers will not survive having in mind the inexpensive copier technology"-was the 
majority opinion. Actually, the court refused to view Texaco’s use as a research use, 
which is expressly listed in the preamble of the fair use statute .The justices choose to 
focus on the potential market for a licensing arrangement for photocopying individual 
articles and on how Texaco’s photocopying could affect the value of the publishers’ 
copyrights in such a market.96 Although the mentioned decision “casts legitimate doubt 
                                                                                                                                                                             
93 See e.g. Maureen Ryan, Fair use and academic expression: rhetoric, reality, and restriction on academic 
freedom, {8 Cornell J.L.& Pub.Pol’y 541}, 543,545 (1999) 
94See  American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F.Supp 1(1992) (Texaco maintained library 
collection which includes different scientific journals for the purpose of furthering research. The plaintiff 
Academic Press, Inc published the Journal of Catalysis in monthly issues. A class of publishers of that 
journal sued Texaco claiming that Texaco's researchers infringed by making photocopies of articles in the 
plaintiffs' publications.) 
95 See Budde, Supra note 79, at 2015  
96 See Netanel, Supra note 3,at 314 (“ Their judgment was based on the neoclassical economic justification 
of copyright. This doctrine drastically limits applications of fair use while at the same time expands 
author’s proprietary rights to creative works. In neoclassicist theory, property rights are fundamental to 
market formation and operation. They enable (or induce) market authors to reduce negotiation costs and 
internalize externalities. But property rights can serve these functions if they are relatively broad and 
clearly defined. More particularly, given the neoclassicist understanding of property’s role in promoting 
allocative efficiency, neoclassicists tend to favor a general conception of private property rights as 
universal, concentrated, exclusive and transferable.”) 
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on whether a court would find similar copying of academic expression by professors and 
researchers on university campuses a fair use “ photocopying articles for research must 
be recognized as fair use.”97 The opposite statement will not be in accordance with the 
ultimate purpose of copyright. The benefit to society of research use is great and the risk 
that photocopying will reduce the amount of published research is low. Scholars publish 
their articles not for economic reasons but mostly because they want to make their work 
available to the learning audience and to transfer the knowledge to others.98 Even when 
the photocopies made from the researchers are exact duplicates of the original articles 
and serve the same purpose as the original articles, this doctrine should apply.  Copying 
is necessary because it allows researchers to have access to a variety of materials to 
compose academic work. The fact that one may copy the articles does not deny the fact 
that each photocopy user remains a potential subscriber, or at least is a potential source of 
royalty income for licensed copying. It seems that under American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco, Inc.,99 there is no fair use for those who can afford to pay a license fee. However, 
despite the use of the copyrighted material after decades of photocopied use, scientists 
continue to write and publishers continue to publish what researchers write. Perhaps more 
significantly, individuals and corporations continue to subscribe to such material. In spite 
of the supposedly detrimental effect of photocopying on the market, Texaco increased the 
number of its subscriptions to the Journal of Catalysis to two in 1983,then to three in 
1988. This confirms the conclusion that the long practice of unlimited photocopying does 
not lead to a decline in the amount of published research, even though researchers are not 
                                                          
97 See  Ryan, Supra note 93, at 557 
98See id. at 568 ( “The academy is the quintessential example of a class of authors whose incentives to 
create are market transcendent….Because academics do not rely on the economic aspects of copyright 
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compensated by the publishers for the articles provided for publication, or for the 
copyright that the authors must transfer to the publishers as a prerequisite for 
publication.”100 In conclusion, copyright restrictions on academic use premised on a 
neoclassical theory of copyright has a negative and direct impact on academic values 
such as critical inquiry, access and dissemination of knowledge. Refusing fair use for 
research imposes a bar on academic freedom, for generating ideas in the university and 
for the broad dialogue among scholars. This ultimately will disserve the public interests 
since a university is generally seen as a political institution, which gives voice and 
responds to the diverse concerns of society. 
     Another area of interest when discussing fair use application is the expansion of the 
scope of protection for biographies and historical works. Generally, these works of 
authorship present an exceptional value for society and are extremely sensitive to the 
issues of fair use as well. Unfortunately, some judges are trying to narrow the protection 
for these works by denying the fair use shelter by injecting into copyright law notions of 
unfair competition and unjust enrichment.101The justices often focus not on the alleged 
substantial similarity in the expression between the contents of the works but on the lack 
of the defendant’s labor in producing its work. This mistaken emphasis on the value of 
labor was the reason for the court in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co102 rejected the fair 
use defense. The judge in that case found infringement based on the copying of 24 
specific passages and “certain general concepts of Anderson and his life and friends as set 
                                                                                                                                                                             
protection to create, academics will produce scholarship without regard to the availability of copyright 
protection” ) 
99 See  Texaco 802 F.Supp.at 1  
100See  Budde, Supra note 79,at 2022 
101See e.g.William F.Patry ,The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law ,64 ( 1995)  
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forth for the first time in plaintiff’s book. The plaintiff spent much time trying to gather 
materials about the life of Hans Christian Andersen-by going to Denmark and by having 
conversations with people who knew something about Andersen and diligently studied 
his letters and original works as well, finally resulting in the writing of the biography. 
Some time after that, her book was used as a source for a novel by the defendant and the 
court failed to recognize defendant’s right to rest on the materials once gathered and 
published from the first author. The judgment was not sound as it might be construed to 
require the defendant to retrace all the steps taken by the plaintiff. This task does not 
conform to the goal of copyright of promoting the progress of science, assuming that 
defendant’s work was not just a colorable variation of plaintiff’s.103 The fair use for 
biographies and historical works should be tolerated because it allows for potential 
second authors to have a great opportunity to build upon previous works while adding 
their original interpretation and revealing their own tenets. Fortunately, in Nash v. 
CBS104, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Toksvig and held that” To the extent Toksvig 
confuses works or ideas with expression, it has justly been criticized…We need not 
revisit Toksvig on its own facts to know that it is a mistake to hitch up at either end of the 
continuum between granting the first author a right to forbid all similar treatments of 
history and granting the second author a right to use anything he pleases of the first’s 
work.” The issue of disputes over biographical works has been addressed in Estate of 
Hemingway v. Random House, Inc 105 as well. In that case, the court had to examine the 
biography of E.Hemingway as written by the defendant. The plaintiff insisted that the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
102 See  Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (The plaintiff-Signe Toksvig made a 
comprehensive research on the life of the well-known writer-Andersen, published a book afterwards and 
that book served as a source for the defendant’s work.)  
103 See  Patry ,Supra note 101, at 66 
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author has used a variety of unpublished and published material of Hemingway and 
documents of ownership passed to the plaintiffs upon Hemingway ’s death. Ultimately, it 
became clear that the appropriated material consisted of only three pages of the 
defendant’s 304-page book. The court dismissed the case for lack of substantial copying 
and the alternate ground of fair use. Also, in the recent cases of the biographies of Igor 
Stravinsky106 and J.D. Salinger107, although each biography served a useful, educational, 
and instructive purpose that tended to favor the defendant, some quotations from the 
writings of Stravinsky and Salinger were not justified by a strong transformative 
secondary objective. The biographers were said to have taken important passages of the 
original writing because they made good reading, not because such quotation was vital to 
demonstrate an objective of the biographers. These were takings of protected expression 
without sufficient transformative justification. Obviously, the court did not conceive the 
particular value of the written biographical books for the general public, but let the 
private interests of the copyright owner to prevail.108 The conclusion to draw is that there 
must be no doubt in the appropriateness of fair use defense when the copying is intended 
to apply to a new biographical or historical work. Society can benefit from works, which 
are biographical portraits of prominent persons since they contain important information 
regarding the past and also about the life of influential people.  The public interest, which 
exists toward these works, is justifiable having in mind the curiosity of the mankind to 
the secrets and mysteries in the history as a whole. If there is a rule, which prohibits all 
quotation of the subject’s prior writings, it would make such biography impossible. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
104 See   Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537,1542 (1990) 
105 See  Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341(1968) 
106 See   Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120(1987) 
107 See  650 F.Supp.413 (1986) 
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Therefore, the position of courts when deciding similar fair use cases must take into 
account public considerations when weighing the relevant factors.  
     The second fair use factor requires a court to examine the” nature of the copyrighted 
work”. Fair use may be determined by the nature of the work .The use of a didactic work 
will be an educational, noncompetitive use and will be assumed to have a minimal impact 
on the copyright owner. In contrast, the use of a creative work will typically be a 
noneducational, competitive use and consequently a significant impact. The rationale for 
this distinction was given by the dissent in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios109.  Informational works such as news reports that readily lend themselves to 
productive use by others are less protected than creative works of entertainment”. The 
law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of 
fantasy or fiction, giving much more protection to the entertainment rather than to factual 
works. It protects more extensively an individual's creativity and labor when invested in 
an entertaining work than when invested in a useful work. Such protection can continue 
attracting additional resources into the creation of copyrighted entertaining works, even 
when those resources would otherwise have been more valuably used elsewhere in our 
economy. The inevitable result of such protection might be that we will have too many 
entertaining works at the expense of having too little of everything else.110 Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 111introduced a second consideration to that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
108 See  Leval, Supra note 73 ,at 1110 
109 See  Sony 464 U.S.at 496-97 
110  See Lunney ,Supra note 46, at 562 
111 See  Harper& Row,Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)(The case required the 
Supreme Court to consider to what extent the “fair use” provision of the Copyright Act of 1976 sanctions 
the unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure’s unpublished manuscript. An undisclosed source 
had provided The Nation magazine with the unpublished manuscript of “A time to heal: The 
Autobiography of Gerald R.Ford.Working directly from the purloined manuscript, an editor of the Nation 
produced a short piece entitled: The Ford Memoirs-Behind the Nixon pardon) 
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factor, namely, whether the copied work was published or unpublished. In Harper &Row, 
the Supreme Court held that the major reason to publish the article was to advance the 
commercial interest of the Nation Magazine. The Nation’s publishers wanted to beat out 
the competition and to create a news event. According to the Supreme Court, Nation’s 
publication had a clearly adverse impact on the market for the work. Nation’s fair use 
defense rested on a claim of news reporting and news reporting is one potential form of 
fair use but there was no presumption of fair use for news reporting in this case. The 
judges considered that the public did not gain any extra benefit from Nation’s publication 
since their article simply copied verbatim the original work and did not add any criticism 
regarding the material. The public gained nothing it could not have obtained from reading 
the original. Despite everything mentioned, the main factor that influenced the court’s 
decision was the unpublished nature of the original.  
     The third fair use factor allows a substantial amount of copying when a factual work is 
involved because usually the second user has to preserve the accuracy of the information, 
which he wants to transfer in his work. The complete reproduction may be considered 
sometimes as a fair use and such an example is reverse engineering. 112 The issue of 
copying entire works arose most prominently after the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act 
in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc 113 where the Supreme Court found” that the 
fact that the entire work is reproduced does not have its ordinary effect of militating 
against a finding of fair use.” The rationale behind that judgment is found in the mere 
                                                          
112See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F. 2d. 832 (1992)(The defendant's copying of the 
whole copyrighted computer program was deemed as "an intermediate step in the design of a competing 
but noninfringing program.). 
113See Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429(1979) (In that case, a unique 
form of copying, “time-shifting”, defined as the “practice of recording a program to view it once at a later 
time, and thereafter erasing it.” was at issue.) 
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definition of time shifting as delayed viewing since there existed no copying, a 
prerequisite for copyright infringement. 
     The forth factor is construed as a measure of loss of market or value of the 
copyrighted work resulting from the use. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc Nation 
Enters. , the Supreme Court designated this factor as ” the single most important element 
of fair use”. 114The court’s recognition of the significance of that factor underlines the 
fact that copyright is not a natural right inherent in authorship. If that is assumed the 
effect of the market will seem irrelevant and any unauthorized taking would be 
unbearable. The utilitarian concept calls for opportunities for authors to realize rewards in 
order to encourage the creations of works.  Obviously, when someone makes copies of 
another's work, it creates a danger for the commercial success of the copyright owner’s 
work and in that way interferes with incentives, offered to the author. Not every type of 
market impairment opposes fair use. For example, adverse criticism may influence the 
market in a negative way but such market impairments are not relevant to determine fair 
use source. The fourth factor disfavors a finding of fair use only when the market is 
impaired because the quoted material serves the consumer as a substitute or in Story’s 
words “supersedes the use of the original”115 Notwithstanding the importance of the 
market factor, it should not overshadow the requirement of justification under the first 
factor, without which there can be no fair use. Judges are inclined to confuse that and for 
example in Basic Books, Inc v. Kinko’s 116 the Supreme Court found that the mere 
repackaging was not fair use although it was intended to facilitate a non-profit purpose 
such as education. The majority supported the idea that the"competetive marketing was 
                                                          
114 See Harper & Row.471 U.S. at 543  
115See Leval, Supra note. 73, at 1120  
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something different from the intentions of the viewers in Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal 
city Studios, Inc,117 who "were not selling their copies of the recorded programs for 
profit” In that case the court concluded that noncommercial time-shifting of free 
broadcast television programming serves the public interest in increasing access to 
television programming, an interest that is consistent with the First Amendment policy of 
providing the fullest possible access to information through the public airwaves and that 
such time shifting  did  not result in actual or potential harm to the market for the 
copyrighted work. The lack of commercial aspects was a strong argument in supporting a 
fair-use defense. In Roy Export Co v. CBS118, the court reasoned, “CBS’s decision to 
broadcast the offending version was motivated by commercial rather than educational 
considerations.” Nor does CBS’ emphasis on the unsponsored nature of the show 
establish that CBS did not use the films for commercial exploitation since common 
experience suggests that CBS stood to gain at least an indirect commercial benefit from 
the ratings boost which it was expecting from the aired special.” This case proves how 
judges sometimes overstate the importance of the forth factor. Similarly, in Harper 
&Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 119, this factor was a powerful obstacle to a 
finding of fair use. The court considered the Nation article appropriated copyrighted 
expression far in excess of what was necessary to satisfy any conceivable legitimate news 
reporting purpose. The publication had the clearly foreseeable effect of destroying Harper 
and Row’s serialization agreement with Time since Nation knew that the portions it 
copied were also of interest to Time and the sales of the book depended upon the public’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
116  See Basic books, 758 F.Supp. at 152  
117 See  Sony 480 F.Supp. at 433 
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reaction to Time’s excerpts. The dissent believed that there was” blatant infringement, a 
direct appropriation of some of the most vivid parts of the book”, thus the use exceeded 
that necessary to write a news article. This case involved “ chiseling for personal profit” 
since Nation, a for profit magazine was trying to sell copies and bolster its own prestige. 
The publisher hoped that the article would sell newsstand copies and generate renewal 
subscriptions. Although Nation’s newsstand profit was small, it was still profit. 
According to the court, the degree of success was irrelevant, but the judges did not 
consider that the publication actually contributed to the dissemination of information and 
knowledge. 
     There always exist competing interests and judges are often compelled to make policy 
considerations. Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.120 When the injury to the 
copyright holder’s potential market would substantially impair the incentive to create 
works for publication, the objectives of the copyright require this factor to weigh against 
the secondary user. This does not mean that public interests should be always 
compromised. Fair use can easily be used as a device for personal profit regardless of 
society’s needs. Judges must take into consideration that fair use must result in a broader 
availability of creative works to the public. Despite the fact that copyright owners have 
been awarded with a “veto whenever their injury is substantial” and guaranteed that the 
fair use system will not put them at an intolerable disadvantage”, the courts should first 
defend   the interests of society which are supreme in copyright law.121 
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CHAPTER V 
MANNERS OF BALANCING THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW 
 
      Although a broad monopoly is considered to be inimical for the achievement of the 
copyright purpose, some authors take an opposite view .A certain number of safeguards 
to expand copyright protection have appeared despite the wide-spread concept that limits 
on copyright are needed. These safeguards assert that the authors are more productive 
when they expect to be awarded with greater monopoly power and correspondingly with 
greater financial gains. Thus, with broader monopoly rights, more works are created and 
disseminated, resulting in greater knowledge. These arguments are based mainly on the 
economic theory of copyright law which views a system of clearly defined property 
rights as a prerequisite for market efficiency. According to the neoclassical economic 
theory, the authors of creative expression must be afforded such proprietary rights that 
extend to every conceivable valuable use. 122All these considerations seem to be flawed 
because they eliminate one very important aspect; namely when authors are granted 
broad monopolies, they may hamper the creation of new works. That is actually a 
monopolistic stagnation. The authors they will not be willing to permit others to produce 
a parody of their original songs or movies, or to write a criticizing article on their book. 
                                                          
122 See Netanel.Supra note 3, at 306 (While the incentive rationale for copyright focuses on the delicate 
balance between access and incentive, the neoclassical economic approach strives to establish markets for 
all potential uses of creative works for which there may be willing buyers .Creative works are thought to be 
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The debates related to the parody version of Roy Orison's song  “Pretty Woman" confirm 
the fears that copyright can be easily turned into a tool for suppressing others’ creative 
freedom. 123  The ultimate result from claiming a broad copyright monopoly will be that 
the all of society will suffer from the lack of a variety of works and the utilitarian purpose 
of copyright law is defeated. Another point in opposition to economic arguments is that 
creative individuals not always rely on the market for their inspiration as many 
masterpieces have emerged for reasons not related with the market. There is no certainty 
that strengthening the protection of copyrighted works will increase the number of new 
creations. Probably the expansion of the copyright will favor large corporate owners of 
many copyrights, but not necessarily the single author. Finally a great monopoly will fail 
to account for the existence of external benefits and non-monetary interests when the 
copyright market is concerned. Modern copyright policy should take into account those 
activities, which yield externalities and cause a market breakdown. Let’s imagine that a 
teacher has to urgently distribute multiple copies of an article in order to provoke a 
discussion on the material. If the focus is on the primary goal of copyright, then the 
teacher acts properly. If there is concern over the rights of the copyright owner, then there 
is likely copyright infringement because the teacher has not received permission for the 
particular copying use of the work. However, the teacher's desire to make and distribute 
                                                                                                                                                                             
commodities whose value is best determined by the market..Viewed from that perspective ,the purpose of 
copyright is to advance and allocate learning and knowledge according to this market-assigned value.) 
123 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,Inc.510 U.S 569 (1994)The rap group 2 Live Crew recorded and 
distributed a parody of the famous song without having obtained an authorization to use the song from the 
copyright owners of Pretty Woman.The district court correctly held that the parodic nature of 2 Live Crew's 
song was meant as commentary and criticism and thus falling under the"umbrella" of "fair use".But the 
court of appeals reversed the finding of fair use and pointed out that the harm to the copyright owner's 
market for the copyrighted work outweighed any parodic purpose that might be found in 2 Live Crew's 
song.Fortunately the Supreme Court recognized the'social benefit" of the new version He did not 
emphasize on the monetary issues and in that way contributed to the outcome of the litigated case in favor 
of 2 Live Crew.) 
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the copies is not done randomly but is done to increase the students’ need for knowledge 
in the most efficient way. The teacher’s diligence should be understood as a step in the 
long-term task to form better-educated students. It is true that education brings numerous 
benefits to all of us as citizens and therefore the teacher's copying must be viewed from 
that perspective. Due to the well-performed mission, he may expect in future enviable 
fruits of his labor. However, these results will reflect on the whole society. Obviously, the 
teacher is not able to capture that value if presumably he is determined to bargain with 
the copyright owner. The problem is the impossibility of internalizing the significant 
external benefits when relying on market principles. It seems that some uses of a work 
can positively affect society to such a great extent that the economic interests of the 
copyright owner are ignored, because the owner’s power has some limits, otherwise he 
may prevent "particularly desirable transfers” which have a positive impact on 
dissemination and the ultimate goals of copyright. 124 
     Very often, arguments in favor of granting more rights to users and correspondingly 
fewer rights to copyright owners are countered by copyright- owning industries. The 
powerful entities governing print and media markets -markets where ideas are 
commodified, are strongly enforcing their monopolies.125 Their concerns mainly reflect 
                                                          
114. See  Gordon, Supra note 10, at 325 
125  See     Associated press Et Al. v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,17(1945), (By-laws of the Associated Press 
cooperative association, engaged in gathering and distributing news in interstate and foreign commerce, 
prohibited service of AP news to non-members, prohibited members from furnishing spontaneous news to 
non-members,and empowered members to block membership applications of competitors.The Court held 
that:"inability  to buy news from the largest news agency,or any one of its multitude of members,can have 
most serious effects on the publication of competitive newspapers,both those presently published and those 
which,but for these restrictions,might be published in the future. The widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public…Freedom to 
publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom of the press from governmental interference 
under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. In addition to 
being a commercial enterprise pursued for profit, the Associated Press, has a relation to the public interest 
unlike that of any other enterprise pursued by profit. .A public interest so essential to the vitality of our 
democratic government may be defeated by private restraints no less than by public censorship.) 
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intentions to generate more revenue by charging monopoly prices instead of serving the 
vital general interests of a free flow of and knowledge. In that way, private corporations 
contribute to the misdistributions of information in society and intervene in the free 
disclosure of ideas. Restraints imposed by these corporations do not only have 
commercial aspects but also in cases similar to that case, usually combine Copyright and 
First Amendment issues thus engendering controversial debates.  126  It is generally 
agreed that the copyright clause implies free-speech values that merit recognition.127 
Starting in the 1960s courts and commentators began their deliberations on the possibility 
of a public interest or First Amendment exception allowing use of copyrighted materials. 
128 The reason for First Amendment exists is to inculcate the freedom of thought and 
religion thus making the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints possible. In Stanley 
v. Georgia 129 it was held that "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a 
state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may 
read or what films he may watch. America’s entire constitutional heritage rebells at the 
thought of giving the government power to control people’s minds. Freedom of speech 
and the press guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution protects the right to receive 
information and ideas regardless of their social worth and this right is basic to free 
society. Free speech is a sophisticated right, which guarantees that expression will remain 
unadulterated. Freedom is a responsibility, an adventure, and a departure from accepted 
                                                          
126See 1-1Nimmer Constitutional Aspects of Copyright Sec.1.10, (Prof. Nimmer puts the question, 
regarding the copyright Act:”Is it not precisely a ‘law” made by Congress that abridges the”freedom of 
speech” and”of the press” in that it punishes expressions by speech and press when such expressions 
consist of the unauthorized use of material protected by copyright?”) 
127See  Patterson and Lindberg, Supra note 16, at 128(“The essential free-speech value in the copyright 
clause is the right of public access to copyrighted materials…The major rights of free speech in the 1 AM 
the   rights to speak and publish; the major free-speech value in the copyright clause is the public's right to 
hear and read" ) 
128 See  Patry, Supra note 101, at 573 
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ways of doing things.130 Referred to speech, it implies the individual choice to present his 
views utilizing the most appropriate and effective medium. The fundamental value of 
speech is interaction because it does not only produce information but also seeks to 
change the listener's perspectives or preferences or tastes, and to shift them closer to the 
speaker’s views. Therefore free speech serves one major value, namely autonomy. The 
merit of speech is in its power to convey one’s thoughts and opinions. It is also an 
opportunity to gain self-esteem through unrestrained expression of one’s tenets, thus 
speech is valuable independent of people's willingness to pay for it since its activity 
differs from the activity of exchange on markets. In short, the market metaphor is not 
proper when talking about the right of free speech because they are fundamentally 
different and contradictory. This is why it is very dangerous to conceive speech as a 
market since that will require people to see speakers as "producers" who exchange ideas 
with willing "consumers", i.e., readers and listeners, up to the point the latter are willing 
to pay for them. Speech protected by the First Amendment does not involve alienating 
one's ideas and trading them for a portion of a listener's or reader's attention or time. The 
basic conflict between copyright and the rights embodied in the First Amendment 
emerges at this juncture. . Copyright laws are said to regulate the economic attributes of 
speaking. Free speech rights are a way to acquire truth and understanding, thus appear to 
be more fundamental than copyright.  In Gillian v. American Broadcasting 
Companies,Inc. , 131the British comedy show Monty Python's Flying Circus successfully 
enjoined the ABC network from broadcasting radically edited versions of the comedy 
programs .ABC had removed an essential part of each show impairing the integrity of the 
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copyrighted work and the result was a "mere caricature" of the authors' talents. Similar 
cases are often treated as contract disputes or matters to be decided under equitable 
principles but they "could be collected and made the building materials for a First 
Amendment claim built into copyright protection".132 In these cases, judges usually make 
conclusions based on the belief that “copyright is proprietary in nature, presumably 
because they are concerned with equity as between the litigants and the equity is most 
often in favor of the copyright owner"133 For example, in Roy Export Co. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc  the court rejected  First Amendment news reporting right to 
use portions of Charlie Chaplin films in a broadcast coverage of Chaplin’s death. CBS’s 
taking was not justified as a “part of a newsworthy event” for fair use purposes since 
CBS ignored and violated the plaintiffs’ rights for its own commercial gain and prestige. 
The reasoning of the court was influenced to a large extent by the economic interests of 
the copyright owner without trying to accommodate them with the right of free access to 
information. If the court applied the First Amendment, the judgment would be different 
This is supported by the statement that the First Amendment is directed to the public and 
should deter the overreaching of copyright when it threatens the interests of society. More 
precisely, the First Amendment and copyright law can exist in “juxtaposition despite their 
apparent opposing purposes” only when copyright is construed as an instrument of public 
policy.134 Contrary to that, judges believe that the proprietary theory is more useful to 
finding a solution to the present conflict.” Proprietary rights tend to be concrete, whereas 
political rights are typically abstract, and in a one-to-one combat of ideas the concrete 
                                                                                                                                                                             
131 See 538 F.2d 14 (1976) 
132See  Moore, Supra note 14, at 162  
133 See  Sullivan, Supra note 130,at 961 
134 See  Harper & Row , 471 U.S. at 559(1983) 
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usually has the advantage over the abstract”.135 It seems that   judges prefer not to explore 
the deep dimensions of political rights and they do not comprehend that First  
Amendment speech rights ensure an access to information and the lack of such access  
parallels totalitarian system. 136The reason for the adoption of the First Amendment has 
been the concern for the protection of the liberty of the press, which was deemed as a 
predicate for democracy in society. If the function of the First Amendment is superseded 
by selfish economic interests of copyright owners, society will lose its democratic 
function. Moreover, the tension between the copyright statute and freedom of speech has 
been viewed as a underlying conflict between property and liberty. The contradiction 
between these two rights is considered to be  ” anathema to the judicial mind."137 First 
Amendment freedom of expression is often portrayed as an enemy of intellectual 
property rights despite the fact that the two rights (copyright and free speech) are 
interrelated because both deal with information, the former in the interest of profit and 
latter concerning freedom.138  Some authors take the view that the First Amendment is a 
significant obstacle for copyright because the First Amendment is seen as an absolute 
right prohibiting all limitations on speech. Other scholars believe that copyright is not a 
built-in exception to First Amendment protection and this rests on a theory that while the 
grant of copyright protection itself is constitutional, it remains a statutory grant, which 
may be superseded by a constitutional grant. “The Copyright may not be read as 
                                                          
135 See   Patterson & Windberg, supra note 16,at 131 
136 See  Board of Education v.Pico ,(457 U.S. 853)  the court held that: school officials may not remove 
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137See e.g. Patterson, Supra note 5,  
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independent of and uncontrolled by the First Amendment.”139 Inevitably the rights of the 
authors abridge, to some extent, freedom of speech but no one really believes that every 
law that abridges speech falls within the First Amendment. “The two kinds of rights 
overlap in the public access because free speech encompasses the right of access except 
the right to disseminate ideas.” The protection afforded is to the communication itself, to 
its source and to its recipients."140. As in the past, publication was the traditional means 
of ensuring access to copyrighted materials and also a condition for copyright but the two 
rights did not seem irreconcilable. Today this could be the basis for a conflict if it is 
assumed that the copyright is a form of monopoly and the copyright owner is authorized 
to exercise complete power over his creation, even in denying    public access. When 
courts have to decide a conflict between the First Amendment and Copyright, they have 
to estimate whether the benefits that may accrue to society from the application of the 
First Amendment are sufficient to compensate for a restraint on the rights of the 
copyright owner. That means that judges must decide whether the importance of the 
particular speech involved outweighs the importance of nonspeech interests. Inevitably, 
the conclusion be drawn will answer policy questions concerning freedom, liberty, 
privacy, right of access to information, democracy and learning. Nevertheless, a fair 
decision must take into account the interests of the public and the community’s welfare.  
In Termineiello v. Chicago the court held that:” It is hazardous to discourage thought, 
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression. That repression breeds hate, that hate 
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menaces stable government.” 141 There is no doubt that the First Amendment plays a great 
role in reinforcing the democratic forces in the society. 142 "From different perspective, 
copyright is supposed to encourage learning and democracy can only flourish in a well 
educated society. It is not necessary to draw a line between speech, which, may be 
prohibited under copyright law, and speech, which, despite its copyright status, may not 
be abridged under the First Amendment. First one must accept that property and liberty 
are complementary, not opposing forces.143Their struggle cannot bring any good either to 
society, or to the individual copyright owner. “Where the First Amendment removes 
obstacles to the free flow of ideas, copyright law adds positive incentives to encourage 
the flow.” 144 
     Today judges are not willing to let First Amendment rights prevail over copyright for 
the same reasons that Americans tend to fear moral rights Moral rights are the last 
significant but most symbolic gap between the basic rights offered to authors by 
American law and the rights enjoyed by authors in most other countries.In the U.S 
system, economic copyright permits authors to obtain monetary remedies or injunctive 
relief from those who substantially copy their works, (in whole or in part). Under the 
European model of intellectual property, copyright is a moral right protecting personality, 
thus justifies remuneration to authors and some control over the work even after it has 
been sold to the public. Americans tend to fear moral rights because of their broad, 
                                                          
141 See  Terminiello v. Chicago 337 U.S. 1(1949)(“The constitutional right to freedom of speech, though 
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143 See e.g.The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J.Copyright Soc’Y 421,426(1983) 
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 64
 
subjective and undefined nature of the word "moral".145  Similar arguments reject First 
Amendment defense to copyright infringement. The moral right of an author to object to 
any distortion, mutilation, modification, or other derogatory action in relation to his/her 
work is linked with his/her right to claim a free dissemination of ideas. If anyone is 
permitted to alter somebody's work of authorship, it means that one deprives the author of 
his/her fundamental right to state in public what he thinks. It follows from the principle 
that free speech requires speech to be secured with some integrity. In Gillian v. ABC146, 
the Court reasoned that authors must be able to prevent 'the mutilation or 
misrepresentation of their work, because to "hold otherwise would contradict the 
economic incentive that serves as the foundation of American copyright law". It is 
obvious that the court did not protect the integrity of the work because of the authors' 
moral considerations or First Amendment arguments. Moreover, judges did not 
emphasize the social benefit of having unchanged works of authorship. Instead they 
looked mainly to the commercial aspects of the substantial departure of the original. In 
that way they subordinated again the right of free speech that was incorporated in the 
infringed moral copyright to the defined market principles. Providing that the author had 
not experienced an economic harm, the court may not have rejected the claim of an 
unreasonable use of the work. In such situations the emphasis on pecuniary rights of 
authors very often leads to detriments for society.  In fact, the public shares an interest in 
knowing the true source of a work and in receiving the work in its unadulterated form so 
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146  See id.  
 65
 
when courts only concentrate on the profit motive, they miss that point.147 One view is 
that market practices generally respect moral rights because usually publishers have a few 
incentives to violate an author's interests in attribution and integrity. Publishers are aware 
that the intentionally misattribution of the work or altering its integrity would bring about 
undesirable consequences such as undermining the economic value of the author's work, 
undermining future works by that author, dissuading other authors from contracting with 
a publisher and injuring the publisher's reputation in the eyes of the public and problems 
if the substitution or mutilation would become public knowledge.148 Nevertheless, there 
are many cases where copyright owners, after having obtained the assigned copyrights, 
are willing to sacrifice the moral rights and   First Amendment rights of the real authors. 
Of course, the "so-called "Moral rights" justification in United States is usually controlled 
by contract law where the author is considered to have no right to prevent alteration if 
one did not reserve the right of integrity at the time the contract was formed. The author 
may bring a claim under unfair competition law if the publisher gives the false 
impression that he is actually selling the author's work. This would convert the question 
from being a matter of social, political or personal (moral) right into a matter related to 
stringent market rules. In cases of controversy, a court will most probably evaluate the 
changes not in terms of free speech rights but solely on the economic interests of the 
copyright owner. Therefore, there is no absolute principle determining the outcome of 
integrity cases but one must not ignore the free speech implications in copyright 
infringement cases when the integrity of the work had been impaired. 
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     The triangle between copyright, the First Amendment and the doctrine of moral rights 
seems to hide many unresolved issues concerning freedom of expression as a necessary 
concomitant of a self-governing society, the fundamental need of learning and access to 
information, and the possessive interests of the copyright owners. Judges need not to be 
too sensitive about the inherent conflict between these rights; instead they should tolerate 
a system that suggests a dissemination of news, information and knowledge from as 
many sources as possible. Only this approach will not hinder the exchange of views in 
society providing that the integrity of the presented information has been preserved. 
Copyright and free speech may reinforce each other in the sense that copyright provides 
financial security to a person for investment in the expression of his/her opinion. Without 
that financial security, there would be fewer work, and thus less speech. The authors must 
be guaranteed with a reward for their labour but their power should be exercised only to a 
limited degree because the goal of copyright is not to enhance their profits. Therefore, the 
courts must manage to negotiate a path between overprotection and underproduction, and 
to strike a balance between the social interest in securing free expression and the author’s 
need of material reward. 
     Under copyright law, one important means of reconciliation of the rights of the author 
and First Amendment interests is the idea-expression dichotomy.“This dichotomy strikes 
a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting 
free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.”149  It buffers 
copyright from charges that it violates the right of free speech. This helps to avoid a 
direct conflict with the First Amendment by immunizing a subsequent work, which 
embodies the same ideas presented in the prior work, thus representing an acceptable 
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definitional balance between copyright and free speech interests. It encroaches upon 
freedom of speech to some degree in that it abridges the right to "reproduce" expression 
of others, but the greater public good in the copyright encouragement of creative work 
justifies this. One can also argue it also encroaches upon the author's right to control 
his/her work that renders his/her ideas, per se unprotectible, but this is justified by the 
greater public need for free access to ideas as promoting democratic dialogue."150  The 
prominent copyright scholar (Nimmer) also takes the view that there can be no First 
Amendment justification for the copying of expression along with the idea simply 
because the copier lacks either the will, the time or energy to create his own 
independently evolved expression. At the same time the scholar found the photographs of 
the MY Lai massacre during the Vietnam war were extremely necessary” to an 
enlightened democratic dialogue”. No amount of words describing the idea of the 
massacre could substitute for the public insights gained through the photographs. The 
photographic expression, not merely the idea, became essential, if the public was to fully 
understand what occurred in that tragic episode. It would be intolerable if the public’s 
comprehension of the full meaning of My Lai could be censored by the copyright owner 
of the photographs.151 The question raised is whether some copyrightable works, which 
enjoy broad public interest protection, might be denied protection and could be used by 
the public source. It is key to interpret what copyright means in using notion of ”idea”. 
Most often it is a label a court attaches to a particular element or a particular level of 
abstraction, after it has been decided that copyright should leave that element 
                                                                                                                                                                             
149  See Harper and Row  723 F.2d at 203  
150 See e.g. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? 
17 U.C.L.A.L Rev. 1180 
151 See  Nimmer Supra note 126,See also 626 F.2d 1171 
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unprotected.152 The idea is perceived not as an epistemological concept, but as a legal 
conclusion prompted by notions; often unarticulated and unproven; of appropriate 
competition. Thus, copyright` doctrine attaches the "idea" label to aspects of works 
which, if protected, would preclude, or render too expensive subsequent authors' 
endeavors."153 Courts decide when and where to use the label "idea" or expression by 
relying on the incentives- access paradigm. If a court feels that access is more important 
either for the creation for new works or to avoid the risk of monopolization, one will 
usually identify the element as an idea. The idea-expression dichotomy has its own 
economic justification as: granting monopolies on ideas would reduce the number of 
works created because each author would have to invest time in creating an original idea 
or incur expense in obtaining a license to use an idea belonging to a previous author who 
“beats him/her to the punch.”154 Protection of ideas per se would encourage entrepreneurs 
to invest resources not in the most important, useful or entertaining ideas, but in ideas 
having the maximum varieties of expression. The third reason not to protect ideas is 
because by their abstract nature, they are often difficult to define for purposes of 
determining their scope and origination.155 They are also not easily traced and it is 
difficult to ascertain the source of an idea and impossible to prove its provenance in any 
meaningful sense. A court cannot be certain about the genealogy of the employed motifs. 
The author can hardly   pin down the root of his inspiration. 156 If that legal axiom does 
not exist, subsequent creators will be not able to utilize, transform and recombine 
different themes, which have been elaborated. A lot of legal battles will be initiated by 
                                                          
152 See Lunney, Supra note 46,at 541 
153 See  Jane C. Ginsburg,No "Sweat"? Copyright and other Protection of works of Information after Feist  
v. Rural Telephone,92 Colum. L.Rev. 338 (1992) 
154See  C.Joyce, W.Patry, M.Leaffer.P.Jaszi. , Copyright Law, 136(2001)  
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the “first authors” who claim ownership on something that does not belong to them. 157 
The copyright monopoly will be so broad that it would impede the production of new 
works since every author may be blamed for crossing the line between the expression and 
the idea.158 The very process of creation will vanish if the authors are scrutinized for 
borrowing someone’s idea.159 Thus, the ideas are usually perceived as components of the 
public domain as composing our cultural heritage”.160 Ideas belong to the vast field of the 
public domain  and this appeals to both potential defendants and plaintiffs in copyright 
infringement cases. Plaintiffs are relieved because there is no need to prove the 
originality of their works but if they would have to do that to recover for copyright 
infringement, few proceedings would ever take place. It will be naïve to think that all 
aspects of a copyrighted work can bear the stamp of the originality. Subconsciously, 
authors withdraw from the public domain as much as they can for their creative process 
while transform their talent. But it is a magical act, which undoubtedly is not subject to 
rational and accurate analysis. The concept of the public domain serves the interests of 
defendants because they can easily resort to it when they are blamed to have stolen 
someone’s’ idea. This is a common defense used when defamation claims have been 
                                                                                                                                                                             
155 See Landes and Posner,An economic Analysis of Copyright law, 18 J.Legal Stud.325,347-53(1989) 
156See  Litman, supra note 30,at 971 
157 See Vaidhyanathan, Supra note 33,at 33 (The distinction between specific expressions and underlying 
ideas is the most widely misunderstood aspect of copyright law.) 
158 The line between the idea and the expression always seems arbitrary no matter where it is drawn. 
Attempting to articulate the approach for discovering the line, Judge Hand stated in his"abstarctions" test:" 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play,a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit 
equally well,as more and more incident is left out.The last may perhaps be no more than the most general 
statement of what the play is about,and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this 
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,since otherwise the playwright could prevent the 
use of his"ideas",to which apart from their expression,his property's never extended. 
159 See Litman, Supra note 30,at 975 (Many will discover that creations they believed were their own 
were,at least in the eyes of the law,mere copies of the works of others. ) 
160See Patterson and Lindberg,Supra note 16, (“The materials that compose our cultural heritage must be 
free for all to use no less than matter necessary for biological survival”)  
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brought. In Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 161the judges held that 
the music of the famous composers belonged to the public domain and the plaintiffs 
could not prevent the appearance of their names as composers of the music despite the 
fact that the film did not appeal to them. The privacy claims were overruled on a public 
domain basis even though it infringed the moral rights of the authors. 
     Since the former author’s works facilitate our intellectual, spiritual and cultural 
development, there must be some certainty that we will have them at our disposal 
whenever we need them. This is one main concern of copyright law, namely to assure 
people that after a precisely defined period of time, the creative works will be “donated “ 
to the public. Therefore, the idea that an author must have total dominon over his/her 
work perpetually disserves the public interest. It appeals emotionally to authors because it 
increases their power especially    regarding the secondary market of their copies. Such a 
power would make copyright an insurmountable economic obstacle for learning. 
Moreover, this will question the idea of copyright law, which exists because it permits 
differentiation of   a copyrighted work and the ownership of that work.  No one is entitled 
to own the work, but someone can own the copyright and the consumer can own a copy 
of that work.162 If society recognizes the ownership of the work, it will be the same as 
giving legal title to things like ideas and dreams. That brings to mind Plato’s Republic 
where the reason why the philosopher was the ruler in the Republic was that he had a 
unique access to the transcendental world of abstract objects. Knowledge of these 
abstract objects was considered to be perfect knowledge. The principal theory behind 
Plato was that in an imperfect society individuals who gained power on the basis of being 
                                                          
161 See    Shostakovich v.Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.87 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (1949) 
162 See    Patterson  &Lindberg  ,Supra note 16, 
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able to restrict access to abstract objects would use that power to gain more power. If we 
interpret Plato’s statements in the right way, it is evident how dangerous it is let 
somebody win a monopoly over ideas. Therefore, copyright traditionally is not extended 
to ideas, methods, systems, plots, scenes a faire, facts and principles or discoveries.163 In 
Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court settled the idea-expression dichotomy holding that 
”The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to 
the world the useful knowledge which it contains.”164 This object would be frustrated if 
the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book. Where 
the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to 
illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be 
considered necessary incidents to the art, and given to the public; not given for the 
purpose of publication in other works’ explanation of the art, but for the purpose of 
practical application”165 
     The lay understanding of the public domain in the copyright context is that it contains 
works free from copyright liability. Works created before the enactment of copyright 
statutes, such as Shakespeare’s Macbeth are available for everyone to use. Another class 
of old works in the public domain are those which had been created so long ago that their 
copyright has already expired, such as Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn. An even larger 
class of uncopyrighted works in America that entered the public domain were those 
ineligible for U.S. copyright or failed to conform with the formal prerequisites under the 
statute. And the most important part is the “realm comprising aspects of copyrighted 
                                                          
163 See e.g. Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F.Supp. 270,278(  )( Scenes a faire are” the common 
stock of literary composition-“cliches’ to which no one can claim literary ownership) 
164 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99(1880) 522,577 
165 See id.  at 103 
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works that copyright does not protect”. 166There is a comprehensive articulation on that 
last part of the public domain, given by Judge Learned Hand in relation with an 
infringement case involving a play entitled Abby's Irish Rose.167 One traditional 
justification for the existence of public domain is that it is the public’s reward for the 
grant of a copyright.168 If a single creator was allowed a free contact with all public 
materials in other to produce his/her work, it would be natural to expect that at the end he 
will contribute to the culture and society. That is the silent agreement in which each new 
author enters when decides to use the benefits of the copyright.169 Copyright endures only 
for a limited time and to make the interaction between the authors’ generations more 
feasible. Meanwhile, numerous works enlarge public discourse, thus allowing society to 
enjoy a variety of plots, topics, themes that are left open to different original 
interpretations. Some view the public domain as a secure harbor and assists the courts 
that are confronted with an insoluble problem in overlapping deeds. Instead of granting a 
particular author with a copyright over a common plot, the better strategy is to declare 
that this plot belongs to the public domain. Drawing the boundaries of the commons is 
                                                          
166 See Litman ,Supra note 30 
167See Nicholas v. Universal Pictures,45 F.2d. 119 (“We assume that the plaintiff’s play is altogether 
original, even to an extent that in fact it is hard to believe. We assume further that ,so far as it has been 
anticipated  by earlier plays of which she knew nothing, that fact is immaterial .Still,as we have already 
said, her copyright did not cover everything that might be drawn from her play; its content went to some 
extent into the public domain” ) 
168 See Patterson and Lindberg,Supra note  16(“Copyright,  of course,is itself an encroachment on the 
public domain, in that it gives the author a limited proprietary control over his or her writings composed of 
ideas and words-materials taken from the public domain.The encroachment permitted, however requires a 
quid pro quo and is limited in both scope and time: to be protected,the author must create a new work, and 
that work is protected for a limited time only.The first requirement means that copyright cannot be used to 
claim ideas or writings already in the public domain.The second means that the work which the author 
produces eventually goes into the public domain.The copyright policy thus serves not only to preserve but 
also to enrich the public domain”) 
169 Id at 138 (An implicit part of the copyright bargain is that the author will not use copyright to inhibit 
learning or to defeat the public domain.He assumes certain obligations in return for the statutory grant:to 
provide public access to the work and to preserve the work for the public domain ) 
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very dangerous as it may hinder the author’ s creative impulses.170If this is not done, then 
it is likely to create a world where all authors must seek permission from each of their 
predecessors. As a result, the overall number of copyrighted works will be diminished. 
Nevertheless the concept of the public domain is created to respond mainly to public 
interests. It can be perceived as a vast ocean; a symbol of the whole human intellectual 
history. The authors are on the board of their own ships, sailing throughout the ocean but 
being aware that the cruise is limited in time. Since all ships are deemed to “sink” to 
fulfill the essential function of sharing and spreading knowledge.  Thus, the world is 
benefited by all achievements in the intellectual sphere. Also, the existence of the public 
domain facilitates the immediate and unrestricted access to certain aspects of copyrighted 
works. The link between the public domain and the idea-expression dichotomy stems 
from ideas being   part of the cultural heritage and no author can own them, proving that 
the monopoly of the copyright owner is limited.  Prospective authors can freely use all 
raw materials they need to build their own “universe of originality” but without claiming 
ownership over them. This means that they are not obliged to solicit permission from 
previous authors and at the same time cannot require future authors to seek their 
permission.   The public domain also rescues judges from the dilemma to estimate and 
compare exact degrees of originality. This eliminates the danger for the public domain’s 
integrity and puts an end to many fruitless disputes. If authors are permitted to assert 
rights over information that does not originate from them, the main concept of the public 
domain will be forfeited. Thus the equilibrium between private and public interests seems 
                                                          
170  See e.g. Lange, Recognizing the public domain 44 law and Contemp.Prob.147  (1981)(For that some 
think that the public domain is more an”information limbo” than an “informational commons” and the 
works put there are likely to be lost. The lack of an economic incentive to exploit some work will prevent 
its appearance in the public space. ) 
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possible if the idea of a vigorous public domain could prevail over indeterminate claims 
of authorship.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
     The conflict between public access and incentives to authors is not a novel problem 
but is merely arised in a new context. The need for copyright protection was first 
recognized because of technological growth .It was not so controversial when it started 
with the invention of the printing press. The Xerox machine, the audio and videotape and 
digitalization brought tremendous changes in the field of copyright because it allowed   
everybody easy access to copy copyrighted materials. Today, the Internet facilitates 
copying and sharing writings among ordinary readers. Moreover, this is in accordance 
with the challenges of the new information technology society. Every new society is a 
negation of the preceding one, where ideas and notions continue to exist deep within the 
new one. Modern society requires a new approach to copyright to consider its 
significance for the development of education and culture that promotes human progress. 
Certainly, some concepts and doctrines must still be in use but others have to be 
reformulated. The emphasis of copyright law must be put on the dissemination of the 
information and all impediments for that, imposed by the rigid copyright rules, should be 
abolished. Copyright is more than just the sum of economic conditions. It has a public 
purpose, which is supposed to be accomplished by its private function, and that creates 
problems when deciding where to draw a public/private distinction. The main problem in 
copyright is that public benefit is usually unsuited to the owner’s benefit. Sometimes 
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society is deprived a benefit because the courts favor the power of the copyright owner. 
There is no golden rule when copyright issues are being discussed. Under a commercial 
value view of copyright, fair use exists simply because the transaction costs of restricting 
copying would be too high to justify enforcement. Despite these cold “law and 
economics” pronouncements, fair use has clear unquantifiable social benefits.  There is 
no possible justification for prohibiting the public from copying what it wants to copy. In 
a free market system, the copyright owners can reap benefits for their work without 
diminishing the access of the public, especially when learning and culture are concerned. 
Complications occur if they start to claim property over their creations. Property is not 
compatible with learning because it poses limitations while learning insists on promotion. 
Copyright policy must be set through the complex interaction among copyright owners 
and society but always such discussions have to be held with sufficient understanding of 
the role and the purpose of copyright. Only in that way copyright can contribute to a 
healthy public sphere where science, democracy and culture are fully recognized. 
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